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THE SHERMAN ACT AND AVOIDING
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
MATTHEW

G. SIPE*

ABSTRACT

In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of void-forvagueness doctrine, including the use of facial challenges. This Article demonstrates that
under prevailing doctrine, the Sherman Act could not survive such a challenge. Although
previous high-profile attempts to invalidate this core statute of antitrust law as unconstitutionally vague were unsuccessful, the landscape has changed considerably since then.
Longstanding deficiencies in the statutory text in terms of notice and consistency have been
exacerbated by a pattern of judicial gloss that tolerates and maintains ambiguity-between
categoriesof analysis as well as within them. The Sherman Act's penalties and enforcement,
moreover, have been enhanced and increased, making the cost of good-faith missteps particularly high. Additionally, the Sherman Act's tension with activities protected by the First
Amendment has increased considerably, not only directly, but indirectly through the proliferation of information and communication markets. Finally, judicial attempts to incorporate a limiting mens rea requirement into the law-a saving grace in other vague statutory
schemes-has proved unworkable and incomplete, if not entirely mooted in this context. In
light of these trends, the Sherman Act requiressome form of congressionalor judicial alteration to maintainconstitutionality moving forward. This Article concludes by briefly exploring such potential solutions, and likely outcomes with respect to antitrust law's vagueness
problem for the years ahead.
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INTRODUCTION

More than a century of judicial gloss has failed to repair the defect
latent in the Sherman Act' since its conception: unconstitutional
vagueness. As this Article demonstrates, the issues of notice and consistency associated with antitrust law's central statute' have swelled
to a strained crescendo-while void-for-vagueness doctrine has grown
only more exacting and more strident. It's not a matter of if the two
will clash-it's a matter of when.
For a punitive statute to pass constitutional muster, it must satisfy minimum standards of notice and consistency. Without "sufficient
definiteness [so] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited," and so that "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"
is prevented, a statute becomes void for vagueness.3 Despite this constitutional benchmark-and the ostensibly regulatory goals of antitrust-the Sherman Act features neither textual specificity nor administrative delegation. Instead, the courts have adopted a wholly
atextual, common-law approach to antitrust, shifting and changing
standards dramatically over the years with prevailing economic theory and climate, and without legislative action. In particular, recent
decades have shown a pattern of courts eliminating or muddying
bright-line antitrust rules that might otherwise have provided clarity
and stability.
This paradigm alone raises significant vagueness concerns and
has led to a fair amount of Supreme Court case law analyzing anti-

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012); 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890).
2. The main antitrust statutes consist of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)),
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012)), and portions of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act (15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)). The Sherman Act broadly covers "restraint[s] of trade or
commerce," "monopoliz[ation]," and "attempt[s] to monopolize." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. The Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Act by more explicitly covering a handful of particular
practices which, at the time, were not clearly within the scope of the Sherman Act: price
discrimination, exclusive dealing and tying, and anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.
15 U.S.C. § 13-19. All have since been covered, at least in part, by Sherman Act case law.
See, e.g., infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussing tying under the Sherman
Act). The FTC Act has broad language similar to that of the Sherman Act, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). And in practice, the FTC Act's scope has been pegged to "conduct that would violate the Sherman Antitrust Act." A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM'N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/
enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/5XNP-ASRX]. Accordingly, the Sherman Act is the
focus of this Article, though many of the vagueness concerns presented herein can thus be
mapped onto the FTC Act implicitly.
3. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) ("[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least
two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know
what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are
necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory
way."); see generally infra Section II.A.
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trust through the lens of vagueness.' Though none of these historical
void-for-vagueness challenges succeeded, the logic of the Court's
analyses has been undercut in each case by modern trends in antitrust law. In particular, the statutory penalties for Sherman Act violations today are much higher, the tension with constitutionally protected activity is much greater, and the attempt to implement a
meaningful and limiting mens rea requirement has proven a failure.
Although other scholars have repeatedly criticized antitrust law as
"vague,"5 or included antitrust cases in more general discussions of
the contours of vagueness doctrine,' there has been no genuine attempt in recent decades to apply void-for-vagueness analysis to antitrust law directly, systematically, and rigorously-confronting historical case law with the contemporary landscape. As this Article
demonstrates, doing so reveals glaring constitutional infirmity.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the development and current
status of void-for-vagueness doctrine. Part II also sets forth what
might be called the "prima facie" case for vagueness with respect to
the Sherman Act. That is, it analyzes to what extent the text of the
Sherman Act itself provides adequate notice and prevents arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Even taking into account the evolution of judicially-created Sherman Act rules and standards, Part II
concludes that the intrinsic issues of vagueness remain pervasiveand, if anything, have grown markedly worse over time.
Parts III, IV, and V broaden the analysis by examining how the
Sherman Act interacts with additional considerations and guiding
principles used in void-for-vagueness doctrine. Specifically, Part III
considers the line between criminal and civil Sherman Act violations,
and how penalties and enforcement have been enhanced in practical
and absolute terms over time. Part IV examines the increasingly
tense relationship between the Sherman Act and constitutionally
protected activity; in particular, First Amendment expression. And
Part V analyzes the Sherman Act's judicially-created mens rea requirement, finding it blurred and myopic in application. Each of
these Parts is centered on one of the landmark Supreme Court cases
rejecting an antitrust void-for-vagueness challenge, leveraging them
as a rubric against which to measure the Sherman Act's modern con4. See infra Sections IIB, IV.B, & V.B.
5. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 57 (4th ed. 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK

5 (2008); Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 370-73 (2014); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
6. See, e.g., John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American CriminalLaws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 336-40 (2002); Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 307 & n.46 (2016); Mila Sohoni,
Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1185-86 & n.76 (2013).
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stitutional shortcomings. Taken together, these analyses indicate
that the case for vagueness with respect to the Sherman Act is even
stronger than the textual, prima facie examination suggests.
Part VI looks to the future, outlining and weighing a variety of

solutions to the Sherman Act's vagueness problem. Setting aside
more fundamental and complete overhauls of the antitrust regime,
the most straightforward options include either eliminating antitrust
law's criminal application, drastically increasing reliance on brightline rules, or crafting a much stricter mens rea requirement. But of
those three, only a robust and limiting mens rea requirement would
likely be sufficient to truly foreclose a well-crafted void-for-vagueness
challenge to the Sherman Act-and do so without rendering modern
antitrust enforcement entirely ineffective.
II.

NOTICE, CONSISTENCY, AND THE SHERMAN ACT

A.

Vagueness Doctrine, Then and Now

Void-for-vagueness doctrine evolved out of a "principle of construction . . . focused on notice."7 In one of the earliest cases discussing the
issue of vagueness, for example, the Supreme Court stated that when
"the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offence .

.

. it

should express its will in language that need not deceive the common
mind."8 Sixteen years later, the Court reiterated that "[1]aws which
create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid." By the 1920s,
this heretofore freestanding notice principle took constitutional root
in the Fifth Amendment right to due process:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a wellrecognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of

fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential [element] of
due process of law.'o

From this reorientation around the right to due process emerged another key focal point of vagueness doctrine: arbitrary enforcement."
7. Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 255, 263-64 (2010).
8. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
9. United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891).
10. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
11. Sarah Sparks, Deteriorated us. Deteriorating: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
and Blight Takings Norwood v. Horney, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (2007) (citing Screws
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By 1983, the Court articulated the test for impermissible vagueness
as essentially two independent prongs: "[1] sufficient definiteness [so]
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
[2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." 2 That is, failure to satisfy either prong is sufficient to
render a statute unconstitutional.13
In addition to the more direct two-pronged vagueness test, the
Court has established a handful of additional considerations and
guiding principles over time. First, vagueness concerns correlate on
a sliding scale with the severity of punishment at issue.1 4 In particular, criminal laws are held to a far higher standard of clarity than
civil laws due to the greater potential for loss of liberty.' 5 Second,
when a statute implicates constitutionally protected activity, such
as the right of free speech or of association under the First Amendment, a more stringent vagueness test applies due to fears of
chilling effects and self-censorship. 6 Third, the inclusion of a mens
rea requirement in a statute can act to minimize otherwise compelling vagueness concerns by acting to limit the statute's scope and
impute notice to violators. 7
The relationship between these additional concerns and antitrust
law will be addressed in greater detail in Parts III-V. The remainder
of Part II is instead dedicated to applying the aforementioned twopronged test for vagueness to the Sherman Act directly and facially,
without second-order considerations. That is, to what degree does the
Act offer satisfactory notice and cabin arbitrary enforcement? Even
without accounting for the additional concerns outlined above, the
Sherman Act exhibits considerable shortcomings. The text itself offers nothing in the way of specificity or definiteness, which has al-

v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) as the earliest example of
arbitrariness concerns); see, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[If
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them.").
12. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (noting a separate "element of
the [vagueness] doctrine" as the "requirement that [the] legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement"); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162 (1972) ("This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice' . . . and because it encourages arbitrary and
erratic arrests and convictions."). See generally Cristina D. Lockwood, CreatingAmbiguity
in the Void for Vagueness Doctrine by Avoiding a Vagueness Determination in Review of
Federal Laws, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 413-17 (2015) (discussing the evolution of twopronged vagueness analysis).
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section IV.A.
17. See infra Section V.A.
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lowed interpretation and implementation to fluctuate dramatically
with economic theory and climate. Exacerbating this pattern, judicially-created bright-line rules-rules that arguably maintained at
least some clarity and notice-have been eroded considerably, if not
eliminated entirely. And although prosecution under the antitrust
laws is currently governed by a policy of self-restraint from the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), even that policy does little to resolve or
address prima facie vagueness concerns, either as a practical matter
or as a matter of law.
It is worth noting at the outset that on other constitutional issues
with respect to statutes, the Court has endorsed two alternative
modes of analysis: "facial" challenges and "as-applied" challenges. 8 A
facial challenger argues that "no application of the statute could be
constitutional," 9 whereas an as-applied challenger argues more narrowly that the application of the statute in the particular case at
hand is unconstitutional. 2 0 Given the relatively extraordinary remedy
for a successful facial challenge-wholesale invalidation of a legislative act-the burden on challengers is high, and the Court demonstrates a general preference for the more restrained option of asapplied challenges instead.2 ' For a time, that same dichotomy (and
preference) was applied more or less straightforwardly in vagueness
cases. 22 But more recent jurisprudence appears to have made all
vagueness analysis implicitly facial-or at the very least markedly
18. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Chilling Rights, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 46-52 (2017)
(discussing the distinction generally and collecting cases); Alex Kreit, Making Sense of
Facialand As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 663-73 (2010) (same).
19. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).
20. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (finding the
statute at issue, "as applied to the advertisements ... in these cases," to be unconstitutional). See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1081
(16th ed. 2007) ("Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case-by-case basis.").
21. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 18, at 663-64 ("The Court has stated its general preference for as-applied challenges consistently, albeit often without much elaboration as to
exactly how the preference should be implemented."); Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied
Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644,
1648 (2009) ("The preference for as-applied challenges, which is hardly unique to the Roberts Court, arises from concerns about judicial restraint and respect for the work of politically accountable branches."). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial
Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 917 (2011) ("[The assumption that facial challenges are
and ought to be rare. . . . is false as an empirical matter and highly dubious as a normative
proposition.").
22. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) ("Objections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome
in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk."
(emphasis added)); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined [as-applied].").
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lowered the bar for facial challenges. As the Court stated in Johnson
v. United States, addressing a vagueness challenge to provisions in
the Armed Career Criminal Act2 3 :
In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could
be read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict
the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. For instance, we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from charging an "unjust or unreasonable rate" void for
vagueness-even though charging someone a thousand dollars
for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and unreasonable.

[United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).]
We have similarly deemed void for vagueness a law prohibiting
people on sidewalks from "conduct[ing] themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by"-even though spitting in someone's face would surely be annoying. [Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611 (1971).] These decisions refute any suggestion that the
existence of some obviously risky crimes establishes the residual
clause's constitutionality.
Resisting the force of these decisions, the dissent insists that "a
statute is void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications." It claims that the prohibition of unjust or unreasonable
rates in L. Cohen Grocery was "vague in all applications," even
though one can easily envision rates so high that they are unreasonable by any measure. It seems to us that the dissent's supposed
requirement of vagueness in all applications is not a requirement
at all, but a tautology: If we hold a statute to be vague, it is vague
in all its applications (and never mind the reality). If the existence
of some clearly unreasonable rates would not save the law in L.
Cohen Grocery, why should the existence of some clearly risky
crimes save the residual clause? 24

Notably, the majority opinion in Johnson dispenses with the terms
"facial" or "as-applied" entirely, further suggesting a collapse between the two when addressing vagueness concerns.25 One may contrast the above language with the Court's more familiar treatment-that same term-of a non-vagueness constitutional challenge. Addressing a challenge under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court noted: "Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a 'law is

23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (2012).
24. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560-61 (2015) (citations omitted).
25. Justice Alito's dissent in particular takes issue with the majority for seemingly
dispensing with the typical dichotomous approach. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2580-83
(Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the historical treatment of vagueness challenges facially
versus as-applied).
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unconstitutional in all of its applications.' "26 This difference highlights the uniquely permissive treatment towards contemporary
vagueness challenges.
A more robust examination of Johnson, situating this development in broader constitutional law, is beyond the scope of this Article. But at a minimum-and of key importance to the analysis herein-Johnson clearly holds that: (1) facial vagueness challenges remain viable, even outside the First Amendment context; and (2) the
existence of some non-vague applications is insufficient to defeat
such a challenge.2 7 The Court's reaffirmance of L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
moreover, hints towards a third key takeaway: the current Court is
particularly skeptical of broadly defined economic proscriptions.
As noted above in Johnson, the Cohen Court found unconstitutionally vague the reenacted Lever Act, which prohibited persons
from "mak[ing] any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in . . . any necessaries."2 8 In particular, the Court
found it clear that Congress had failed to "fix[ . . . an ascertainable
standard of guilt . . . adequate to inform persons":
Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite act. It confines the subject-matter of the investigation which it authorizes to
no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to which it
provides. It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry,
the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no
one can foreshadow or adequately guard against. In fact, we see no
reason to doubt the soundness of the observation of the court below, in its opinion, to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute
which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental
to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury.And that this is not a mere abstraction,
finds abundant demonstration in the cases now before us, since in
the briefs in these cases the conflicting results which have arisen
from the painstaking attempts of enlightened judges in seeking to
carry out the statute in cases brought before them are vividly portrayed.2 1

That the Court today would choose to reaffirm this scathing vagueness analysis-in particular, directed towards "unreasonable" market
behavior "detrimental" to the public-should raise red flags to anyone familiar with the broad arc of antitrust law, and should be kept

26. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) (quoting Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
27. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558-63.
28. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 81-82 n.1 (1921) (quoting 41
Stat. 297 (1919)).
29. Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added).
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in mind throughout the analysis herein. As the next Section in particular outlines, the text, historical practice, and judicially-created
framework for the Sherman Act is at least as vague as what the Lever Act demanded, if not more so.
B.

The PrimaFacie Case for Sherman Act Vagueness

1. Text and HistoricalImplementation:A Century of Ebb and
Flow
Whether by design, compromise, or oversight, the text of the
Sherman Act is quite open-ended. Section 1 declares as illegal
"[e]very contract, combination . .. or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce." 3 0 But of course, all contracts restrain trade or commerce; by definition, the two contracting parties are prevented from
doing their agreed-upon business with anyone else without incurring
the costs of breach. 3 1 This has forced the Court to flatly reject the
plain-text, "literal" terms of section 1-that is, not every arrangement
in restraint of trade is illegal, only "unreasonable" ones. 3 2 The text of
section 2 is no more clear. That section makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or . . . conspire . . . to monopolize," but
it does not define or elaborate on the crucial term "monopolize." 3 3 The
plain meaning of that term would seem to suggest that the act of acquiring 100% market share is itself rendered illegal, or perhaps any
act with the intention towards that ultimate goal. 34 But again, the
Court has rejected the literal terms of the Act-it is not illegal to obtain a monopoly position. 3 5
Faced with this level of textual ambiguity, the Court has adopted
a "common-law"-almost "constitutional"-approach to interpreting
the Act. 3 6 That is, over time and through precedent, the Court has
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
31. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their
very essence."); see also Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 223 n.174 (2016).
32. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
34.

See D.N. DWIVEDI, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 247 (2d ed. 2009) ("[A] monopoly

market is one in which there is only one seller of a product having no close substitute.");
U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL

MERGER GUIDELINES

18 n.9

(2010),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4C6D-R6SZ] (defining a "pure monopoly" as a market with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of
10,000, which means a single firm has market share of 100 percent).
35. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) ("[T]he possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct." (emphasis omitted)).
36. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
("From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.");
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created a complex framework of tests, presumptions, and mitigating
factors wholly absent from the text of the Sherman Act itself. To
some extent, this may be charitably viewed as "an implicit delegation
of lawmaking power to courts." 3 7 But there are clear limits to the
propriety of this common-law delegation approach.
First and foremost, it is clearly established that federal courts lack
the power to create common-law crimes, 38 and the Sherman Act is a
criminally-enforced statute. 3 9 That is, where a statute incorporates a
body of common or constitutional law, it becomes a static snapshot of
the relevant common law at the time of enactment-not a conduit for
the common law as it evolves. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1584 criminalizes "involuntary servitude,"4 0 a term "clearly borrowed" from the
Thirteenth Amendment. 4 1 While the Court recognized that this was
an attempt to "incorporate by reference a large body of potentially
evolving federal law," they also recognized the due process requirement "that a statute prescribing criminal punishment must be interpreted in a manner that provides a definite standard of guilt."4 2 As
the Court elaborated:
It is one thing to recognize that some degree of uncertainty exists
whenever judges and juries are called upon to apply substantive
standards established by Congress; it would be quite another thing
to tolerate the arbitrariness and unfairness of a legal system in

.

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[T]he general presumption that legislative
changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act . . . .");
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (comparing the Sherman Act
to "the Magna Carta" and "the Bill of Rights"); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S.
553, 600 (1936) ("We have said that the Sherman [Antitrust] Act ...
has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.").
37. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S. CT. REV. 345,
347; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 44-45 (1985) ("It thus seems reasonable to construe section 1 of the Sherman Act as
federalizing the common law of unlawful restraints of trade-in other words, as reflecting a
decision by Congress to transform a body of existing common law . .. into federal law and
to authorize federal courts to continue to build upon that law through the incremental
case-by-case process." (footnote omitted)).
38. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("[A]ll exercise of
criminal jurisdiction in common law cases we are of opinion is not within [the courts'] implied powers."); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) ("The definition
of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case
of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute." (citation omitted)); Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) ("[T]here is
no federal common law of crimes . .
39. See infra Section III.C.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012).
41. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 932 (1988); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States.").
42. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 941.
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which the judges would develop the standards for imposing criminal punishment on a case-by-case basis.4 3

For that reason, the Court held that the meaning of the statute could
not be driven by dynamic, evolving Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, the proper interpretation of the statute must be based
on a snapshot of "the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment
that prevailed at the time of § 1584's enactment."44
The courts have not taken this approach with the Sherman Act.
Although some early decisions were explicitly pegged to extant common law restraint-of-trade doctrine, 45 the Sherman Act as interpreted
today is no longer based on a "static" snapshot of the understanding of
those terms in 1890.46 Instead, the Court has allowed the meaning of
the Sherman Act to fluctuate dramatically with changes in reigning
economic theory, policy, and climate-without warning to defendants.
A cursory examination of the last sixty years will suffice. By the
1950s and early 1960s, the dominant conception of antitrust law was
essentially populist in nature; small, local businesses were to be protected and concentrations of economic power were to be strictly limited.4 7 This conception may be exemplified by what is generally considered the "high-water mark" 48 of antitrust enforcement, United
43. Id. at 951.
44. Id. at 945. See generally Kahan, supra note 37, at 361-63.
45. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911) ("It is
certain that those terms, at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the
common law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of
the adoption of the [Sherman Act].").
46. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman
Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to
the term in 1890.").
47. The work of Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner represents a highly influential capstone to that era. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 22 (1959); see William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited:
Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413,
1414-16 (1990) (describing the prominence and historical context of Kaysen and Turner's
book). For scholarship detailing the reign of the populist antitrust conception retrospectively, see Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of
Antitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2015); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The
FundamentalGoal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 191, 207 (2008); Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1515, 152021 (1984); and Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLuM.
L. REV. 363 (1965).
48. Dennis A. Yao, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Challenges in Merger Analysis: The 1992
Merger Guidelines and Beyond 3 (Dec. 2, 1992), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public statements/694541/19921202_yao-challenges-in

merger analysis-

the_1992_merger guidelines-andbeyond.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD9F-7ARS];

see also

BERNICE ROTHMAN HASIN, CONSUMERS, COMMISSIONS, AND CONGRESS: LAW, THEORY, AND
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1968-1985, at 48 (1987); KY P. EWING, JR., COMPETITION
RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE 128 (2d ed. 2006).
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States v. Von's Grocery Co., 49 a case which prohibited the merger of

two grocery stores that would have had less than ten percent combined market share. Over the course of a few decades, however, this
value system was thoroughly ousted by the so-called Chicago School
of economic theory-led most notably by Judge Robert Bork 5 -that
prioritized economic efficiency over pure disaggregation of economic
power. 5' As Judge Douglas Ginsburg explains, this efficiencypromoting conception of the antitrust laws went from entirely "novel"
and heterodox in the 1960s to "the conventional wisdom of the federal
courts" by the 1980s.52 Now, another few decades later, the Chicago
School appears to be waning, while a fresh consensus emerges-this
time focusing largely on consumer welfare and protection directly. 53
Even within these antitrust epochs, criminal liability under the
Sherman Act has fluctuated based on macroeconomic cycles. Consider, for example, the arc between United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 5 4 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,5 5 and United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 5 6 In 1927, Trenton unambiguously held that

for charges of price fixing, the reasonableness of the underlying arrangement was no defense.5 7 In 1933, Appalachian Coals seemingly
flipped the policy, finding that an "essential standard of reasonableness" prevented prosecution of a group of coal sellers forming a cartel
and setting uniform prices.58 Finally, in 1940, Socony-Vacuum flipped
back, holding that the "reasonableness" of a price-fixing arrangement
was "wholly irrelevant." 5 9 Though the Court in each case took pains
49. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
50.

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH

ITSELF 196 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & ECON. 7, 44 (1966).
51. Douglas H. Ginsburg, An Introduction to Bork (1966), 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L
225, 225-27 (2006).
52. Id. at 27.
53.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) ("Almost every-

one professionally involved in antitrust today . . . agrees that the only goal of the antitrust
laws should be to promote economic welfare .... ); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 47, at
192 ("[C]urrent Supreme Court opinions focus much more on protecting consumers than on
increasing efficiency. . . . When conduct presents a conflict between protecting consumers
and promoting the efficiency of the economy . . . the courts have always chosen consumer
protection over efficiency."); Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 338 (2010) ("[T]he standard legislated by Congress in adopting the
Sherman Act-the standard currently used by antitrust agencies and our judicial systemis the true consumer welfare standard.").
54. 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
55. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
56. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
57. Trenton, 273 U.S. at 401.
58. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 360, 378.
59. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 243.
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to distinguish between the facts at issue, rather than explicitly overrule, contemporary scholars generally explain this doctrinal zig-zag
as a direct result of the economic environment of the Great Depression.6 0 That is, the seemingly fragile Appalachian coal industry was
permitted to fix prices-an otherwise per se violation-in order to
stay afloat; the Court was loath to force yet another industrial sector
to go underwater in such harsh economic times.
In short, the text of the Sherman Act-already ambiguous and
open-ended-has been rejected at face value by the courts in favor of
a common-law approach that far exceeds the bounds of permissible
delegation. Even if such an approach were permissible in the abstract, a review of the Sherman Act's actual historical application
reveals a pattern of judicially-driven (and defendant-borne) ebbs and
flows, a pattern fundamentally at odds with notice and consistency.6
2. Judicially-CreatedFramework:From Bright-Line Rules to
I-Know-it-When-I-See-it
The aforementioned changes over time in underlying theory and
climate have been coupled with a long-term increase in flexibility in
the borders of Sherman Act doctrine itself. Nowhere is this clearer
than in the general retreat from per se rules,6 2 which might otherwise
60.

See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATION

38 (4th ed. 2005); 2 EARL W. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW:

PRACTICES PROHIBITED BY THE SHERMAN ACT (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS (2d ed.
1981); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005);

William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 48 (2000); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-Historyof Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 288-90; Stucke, supra note 5, at 1400 ("Nonetheless, in
the height of the Great Depression, the Court did not apply its per se rule to an agreement among competitors to fix price."); Diane P. Wood, The U.S. Antitrust Laws in a
Global Context, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 265 passim.
61. Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, among others, have argued that
the historical malleability of the Sherman Act is evidence that it is a kind of "superstatute"-foundational, fundamental, and potentially exercising "a gravitational pull on
constitutional law itself." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
DUKE L.J. 1215, 1236 (2001). Even if one accepts that the Sherman Act once occupied that
position, it is unlikely that it continues to do so. The trend more recently has been profound
skepticism towards antitrust-even outright preemption by other, non-"super" statutory
schemes. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279-81 (2007);
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004).
See generally Matthew G. Sipe, Patents u. Antitrust: Preempting Conflict, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
415, 418-25 (2016) (outlining the modern shift towards antitrust skepticism and preemption). This trend, coupled with the sharp decline in antitrust's political and popular salience, makes it highly unlikely that the Sherman Act today would be sheltered or exempt
from otherwise controlling constitutional doctrines-including void-for-vagueness. See
infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
62. Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW 435, 436
(2012) ("The Supreme Court has ...
continually narrowed the types of conduct subject to
per se condemnation.").
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provide clear notice and predictability. Per se rules treat certain
"categories of restraints [of trade] as necessarily illegal," thereby
"eliminat[ing] the need to study the reasonableness of an individual
restraint in light of the real market forces at work." 6 3 As the Court
itself has recognized: "Without the per se rules, businessmen [are]
left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what
courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act." 6 4 In
spite of this recognition, the Court has consistently replaced per se
rules with the open-ended, catchall rule of reason-a rule flexible
enough to serve shifting economic theories or policy goals:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.6 5

The Court has eliminated per se rules explicitly, as well as implicitly, in favor of a flexible and holistic analysis-which, for all its virtues, 6 6 exacerbates concerns of vagueness.6 7

63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citing
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
64. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972) (emphasis omitted). The comparatively greater uncertainty of the rule of reason has near-universal recognition among legal scholars as well. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture
Analysis After American Needle, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 546 (2011) ("Full-blown
rule-of-reason analysis subjects defendants to considerable expense and uncertainty.");
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 n.28 (2012) ("The proposition that rule of
reason litigation can be uncertain and costly . . . does not appear to be controversial.").
65. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Even today, this
remains the "classic articulation" of how to proceed under the rule of reason. United States
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also 1 CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:37 (4th ed. 2010) ("Modern attempts to refine or further develop the rule of reason, as announced by Justice Brandeis in
1918, are virtually nonexistent.").
66. See infra Part VI.
67. See, e.g., Devlin & Jacobs, supranote 64 at 546 ("Full-blown rule-of-reason analysis subjects defendants to considerable expense and uncertainty."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984) ("Litigation costs are the product of
vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than
in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason."); see also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 917 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("Are there special advantages to a bright-line rule? Without such a rule, it
is often unfair . . . for enforcement officials to bring criminal proceedings."). But see, e.g.,
Gavil, supra note 64, at 734 (arguing that, in its contemporary applications, the rule of
reason has been "honed to focus on specific, core economic concepts" instead of "vague,
throw-in-the-kitchen-sink formulations"). Even accepting, arguendo, the merits of this
more skeptical position, a well-grounded rule of reason is still by definition more open-ended
and less certain than an outright categorical approach as used in classic per se analysis.
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For example, minimum resale price maintenance6 8 was long held
to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. In Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the Court stated unequivocally that the
rule of reason does not apply to minimum resale price maintenance
arrangements, treating them identically to horizontal price fixing:
[R]estraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular
case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable ....

But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their
sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices,
are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved by
the advantages which the participants expect to derive from the
enhanced price to the consumer.6 9

Reversing almost one hundred years of precedent, in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court overruled Dr. Miles
explicitly.7 0 Agreeing to set a minimum price vertically, the Court
reasoned, may actually have "procompetitive effects"; interbrand
competition is increased at the expense of intrabrand competition,
and retailers are encouraged to offer more services as free-rider incentives are eliminated.7 ' Accordingly, the Court held that the more
open-ended rule of reason ought to apply-asking the lower courts, in
particular, to take into account "the number of manufacturers that
make use of the practice," whether those manufacturers have "market power," and the practices of downstream retailers.7 2
Far from an isolated example, Leegin is the apotheosis of a "major
turning point in antitrust law." 7 3 The Court has consistently and
"systematically [gone] about the task of dismantling many of the per
se rules it [has] created." 7 4 Another vertical restraint, territorial division, has gone from being considered "so obviously destructive of
68. Resale price maintenance is a form of vertical price fixing, whereby an upstream
market participant (such as a manufacturer) conducts business only with downstream
market participants (such as retailers and distributors) who agree to sell the product at or
above a certain price. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885.
69. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406-08 (1911).
70. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
71.

Id. at 890-93; see also Michael L. Denger & Joshua Lipton, The Rule of Reason and

'Leegin Policies'" The Supreme Court's Guidance, 22 ANTITRUST 45 (2007).
72.

Leegin, 551 U.S. at 896-98.

73.

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36 (2007),

http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report recommendation/amc_final report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9C8L-FRFS].
74. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 358 (2002).
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competition that [its] mere existence"75 is intolerable to a welcome
method of "stimulati[ng] . . . interbrand competition" and "achiev[ing]
certain efficiencies in . . . distribution."7 6 Maximum resale price
maintenance underwent a similarly stark reversal-from a practice
that "cripple[s] the freedom of traders" and is intrinsically "injurious
to the public"7 7 to a practice with "procompetitive effects" that "benefit[s] consumers regardless of how those prices are set."7 8 The result
is that lower courts-and hence, market participants seeking to comply with antitrust law-are increasingly asked ex ante to measure
and balance factors including market structure, price changes over
time, output quantity and quality, and consumer behavior.7 9 And, to
be clear, this trend has operated exclusively in one direction; once the
rule of reason has conquered a given category of economic behavior,
per se analysis does not recover that lost ground.80

75. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379, 382 (1967) ("Once the
manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with dominion over the product,
and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred ... is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.").
76. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52, 54, 57-58 (1977)
("[T]here is substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic utility.
There is relatively little authority to the contrary. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the per
se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled."). See generally Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad
Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its "Rule of Reason"- The Dealer Termination Cases and the
Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REV. 129, 135-44 (1989) (discussing in
detail the doctrinal arc between Schwinn and GTE Sylvania).
77. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151, 152, 154 (1968) (affirming that "agreements to fix maximum [resale] prices" are "perse violation[s] of the law").
78. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (quoting Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)). See generally Richard M. Steuer, Khan and the
Issue of Dealer Power-Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 531 (1998) (analyzing the shift in
economic rationale between Albrecht and Khan).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238-44 (2d Cir. 2003). It
is worth mentioning, moreover, the implicit need to weigh and consider competing economic theories on each of those factors as well. See Stucke, supra note 5, at 1386 ("The courts
will weigh not only conflicting testimony by Industrial Organization economists but conflicting economic theories, with the rise of behavioral, evolutionary, and New Institutional
Economics.").
80. See Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing A Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 612 (2012) ("[T]he Court
has . .. created no new per se rule in at least a half century."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994) (concluding that the rule of reason has "prevail[ed]" over
per se analysis). The doctrinal switch between Appalachian Coals and Socony-Vacuum Oil
arguably provides a counterexample-the only one of its kind. See supra notes 54-60 and
accompanying text. But, as noted earlier, even the Appalachian Coals Court did not express its holding as "overruling" the per se analysis stated in Trenton Potteries. And the
Socony-Vacuum Oil Court characterized its holding as simply staying true to the supposedly undisturbed line of per se horizontal price-fixing cases, including Trenton Potteries.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) ("Thus for over forty
years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that pricefixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. . . .").
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Today, "[t]he vast majority of trade-restraint categories receive
rule of reason treatment."8' But even where per se categories have
not been replaced by the rule of reason explicitly, the divide between
per se and rule-of-reason analysis has broken down considerably.
That is, case law increasingly demands that courts apply the same
holistic, case-by-case analysis embodied by the rule of reason in order
to apply the "per se" label in the first place. Put differently, the detail
and vagueness of the rule of reason have been transformed into a
threshold inquiry for per se cases. This per se step zero undermines
any precision or clarity in the Sherman Act that the use of per se
rules might have otherwise maintained.
Consider the case law governing boycotts. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., the Court examined a group of appliance manufacturers and distributors boycotting a particular retail store.8 2 The
Court unambiguously stated that such boycotts were per se Sherman
Act violations:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They
have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the
specific circumstances .

. .

. Even when they operated to lower prices

or temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned....

It clearly has, by its "nature" and "character," a "monopolistic tendency."83

Without explicitly overruling this seemingly bright-line and straightforward per se rule, the Court has blurred its boundaries significantly. 84 For example, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's application of the per se rule against boycotts to a purchasing cooperative's boycott of a certain retailer.8 5 Although reaffirming that "group
boycotts are so likely to restrict competition . . . that they should be
condemned as per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act," the Court
warned that "[e]xactly what types of activity fall within the forbidden

81. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, CategoricalAnalysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2008).

82. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
83. Id. at 212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).
84. See Donald L. Beschle, Doing Well, Doing Good and Doing Both: A Frameworkfor
the Analysis of Noncommercial Boycotts Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 ST. LOUIs U. L.J.

385, 391 (1986) ("It has become evident in recent years that this initial step of categorization . . . often requires a judicial effort approaching the level of complexity involved in the
full rule of reason analysis.").
85.
(1985).

Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
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category is, however, far from certain."8 6 The Court's analysis provided a number of threshold factors to be considered prior to application
of the per se rule, which the Ninth Circuit later summarized as
whether: "(1) the boycott cuts off access to a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the victim firm to compete; (2) the boycotting
firm possesses a dominant market position; and (3) the practices are
not justified by plausible arguments that they enhanced overall efficiency or competition."
But these threshold inquiries-market structure, efficiency, and
market power-are classic components of the more flexible and
amorphous rule of reason. In other words, the case law dictates that
''courts must apply the rule of reason in order to determine whether
the per se rule applies" in the first place.88 To the extent that the ambiguities inherent in the rule of reason are effectively imported into
per se analyses as a step-zero inquiry, the latter category is no less
vaguely defined.
The case law on tying89 follows a similar arc. In the earliest tying
cases to reach the Court, it was quick to decide that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,"90 and have a "creeping" tendency to "create a monopoly."9 ' Accordingly, the Court labeled tying arrangements illegal per se, and
even highlighted the considerably bright-line nature of that holding:
[In International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947)], [t]he Court ruled that it was "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market" by tying arrangements. As we later analyzed the decision, "it was not established
that equivalent machines were unobtainable, it was not indicated
what proportion of the business of supplying such machines was
controlled by defendant, and it was deemed irrelevant that there
was no evidence as to the actual effect of the tying clauses upon
competition."9 2

In the years since, however, that bright line has dimmed-if not
darkened completely. Although the Court has remained steadfast in
86. Id. at 290, 294 (emphasis omitted).
87. Hahn v. Or. Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 1988).
88. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1229; see also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A.
Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 757, 774 (1992) ("A per se rule that applies only when a defendant has market power
and cannot show procompetitive effects is no per se rule at all.").
89. Tying refers to the practice of selling one product-the "tying" product-only on
the condition that the buyer purchases a different product as well-the "tied" product. See,
e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
90. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
91. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
92. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 9 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 337 U.S. at 305)
(emphasis added).
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refusing to abandon the "per se" label, 9 3 tying cases in practice require that judges wade into murkier waters:
There are four elements to a per se tying violation: (1) the tying
and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant has
market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to purchase the tied product from it;
and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of
commerce.94

This step-zero analysis "requires the court to define product markets,
examine market power, and consider business justifications"undoubtedly rule-of-reason elements.9 5
The doctrine on horizontal price fixing-that is, price fixing between direct competitors-offers a final, relatively stark example.
Price fixing "has been a per se violation of the Sherman Act from the
very beginning."96 Beyond the aforementioned back-and-forth of Trenton Potteries,Appalachian Coals, and Socony-Vacuum,9 7 the case law
solidly affirms that price fixing is illegal per se:
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule is inapplicable because their agreements are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a misunderstanding
of the per se concept. The anticompetitive potential inherent in all
price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered for some. Those claims of
enhanced competition are so unlikely to prove significant in any
particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in
its general application.98

93. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) ("It is far too late
in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.' "); see also id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging the majority to
"abandon the 'per se' label").
94. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992), and Jefferson Parish,
466 U.S. at 12-18).
95. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1250, 1251 (referring to the "per se" label for
tying as a "lie" outright, and stating that it "belongs in the rule of reason box"); see also
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) (referring to the post-Jefferson Parish test as a "quasi-per se" rule); Christopher R. Leslie, Patent Tying, Price Discrimination,and Innovation,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 811, 847 (2011) (referring to contemporary tying doctrine as a "nominal
per se rule, which in practice operates as a truncated rule of reason").
96. Sheldon Kimmel, How and Why the Per Se Rule Against Price-FixingWent Wrong,
19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 245, 245 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)); see also Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at
1225 ("Horizontal price fixing represents the epitome of per se illegal conduct.").
97. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
98. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted).
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On the other hand, the Court continues to distinguish between "price
fixing in a literal sense" and "price fixing in the antitrust sense"with only the latter constituting a per se violation." But the matter
of distinguishing between the two appears to import considerations
that bring to mind the rule of reason: courts must consider "the effect
and .

.

. the purpose of the practice," including "efficiency" and poten-

tially pro-"competitive" justifications. 00 In other words, the distinction relies, at bottom, on a "functional market analysis."'o A per se
rule constructed in this way offers enhanced adaptability, to be
sure-but it does relatively little over the rule of reason to alleviate
vagueness concerns.
Scholars have rightfully observed that this form of categoryblurring, beyond undermining the benefits of per se analysis, leads
to even less clarity or predictability than an outright rule of reason. 02 That is, the parties are forced to speculate-and litigateover initial categorization in addition to the actual weighing and
balancing of interests on the merits. The courts, meanwhile, have
leeway to conceal more complex analyses under the nominal label of
"per se" when it is expedient to do so. Indeed, there is little forcing
courts to be transparent in their categorization, even when it may
be outcome-determinative.
The Sherman Act's judicially-created framework of rules, instead
of providing the notice and consistency otherwise lacking in the statutory text itself, has thus single-mindedly elevated discretion and
flexibility. One by one, the courts have eliminated the bright and
predictable lines of per se analysis, whether explicitly and outright or
implicitly through threshold rule-of-reason inquiry. Compliance in
the shadow of Sherman Act jurisprudence thereby means weighing
the totality of all economic factors and market effects and determining whether the activity in question will be found "reasonable" down
the line by a judge or jury. Or, to circle back to the L. Cohen Grocery
holding reaffirmed by the Court in Johnson: "to attempt to enforce
99. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
100. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19-20.
101. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1226.
102. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 64, at 769 & n.174 (collecting lower court cases exemplifying a "sliding scale" approach between true per se and rule of reason analyses, rather than
"discrete and alternate choices" between the two); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1250
("This ill-conceived and outmoded categorization creates the worst of both worlds-the cost of
the rule of reason without its precision."); Alan J. Meese, In Praiseof All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 839
(2016) (noting that parties are left to "speculate about the status" of certain kinds of economic
activity, and that "[s]uch ambiguity increases the cost of . . . analysis"); ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 23, THE RULE OF REASON 10 (1999) ("[The line between application of the per se rule and the rule of reason has become blurred to the point that these analytical tools are often indecipherable.").
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the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a
statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the
estimation of the court and jury."1 0 3 Thus, at least on its face, a modern void-for-vagueness challenge would present a serious threat to
the Sherman Act.
3.

Enforcement Policy: Empty Self-Restraint

It is worth noting, at least in passing, the actual modern practice
of antitrust prosecution. To its credit, the DOJ-tasked with enforcing the Sherman Act's criminal provisions-has expressed a policy of
self-restraint. That is, although no such division exists in the law itself, the DOJ limits its criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act to
per se violations-pursuing rule-of-reason violations through civil
mechanisms only.1 04 This policy appears to be based, at least in part,
on a desire to apply criminal sanctions only to conduct that is "clearly
illegal," echoing vagueness concerns at least implicitly.

05

And the

numbers do appear to plausibly reflect the DOJ's desire to pursue
criminally only the worst offenders; although prison terms and fines
per case have all increased, 06 the actual number of criminal antitrust
cases filed has "decreas[ed] steadily since 2011."107
103. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1921); see supra notes
28-29 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 2.03[3] (2006) ("Traditionally, the Antitrust Division will seek criminal prosecution only for per se violations."); Abbe Gluck, PreservingPer Se, 108 YALE L.J. 913, 915 (1999) ("[C]riminal antitrust prosecutions typically target only per se offenses."); The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
[https://perma.cc/PS87-Z3CT] ("Criminal prosecutions are typically limited to intentional
and clear violations . . . ."); Antitrust Resource Manual, OFF. U.S. ATT'YS,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-1-attorney-generals-policystatement [https://perma.cc/UW8N-9U4S] ("Virtually all antitrust offenses likely to be
prosecuted by a United States Attorney's office will be governed by the 'per se' rule."); cf
Roxann E. Henry, Criminal Cartels:Price Fixing and Market/Sales Allocation Agreements,
Am. HEALTH LAW. ASS'N, Feb. 17, 2000 ("Some would believe that this distinction is a necessary step in evaluating potential criminal exposure, that only per se offenses can engender criminal liability. There is no legal support for that position, and criminal cases under
the rule of reason have been brought in the distant past.").
105. ANTITRUST DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION: FY 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
28,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2008justification/pdf/21latr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
ZJ2D-AHT7] ("[Tlhe Antitrust Division ...
investigat[es] and challeng[es] violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, including such per se (in and of themselves, clearly illegal)
violations as price fixing, bid rigging, and horizontal customer and territorial allocations."); see, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces It
Would Challenge Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Proposal (Oct. 1, 1993),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press releases/1993/211376.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
B7UK-QEQF] (describing various per se violations as "clearly unlawful" and "clearly illegal").
106. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
107. TIMOTHY WESTRICK, ABA SECTION OF LITIG., U.S. ANTITRUST CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE TRENDS POST REALIGNMENT 3 (2014),
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This policy, however, does little to alleviate vagueness concerns in
practice for at least four core reasons. First, because the DOJ's policy
of self-restraint is patterned in large part on the dichotomy between
per se and rule-of-reason offenses, its value in terms of notice and
clarity is significantly undermined by the trend of categorical blurring outlined in Section II.B.2. Where the per se analysis is as flexible and open-ended as the rule of reason, it is sleight-of-hand for the
DOJ to treat "per se" and "clearly illegal" as interchangeable concepts. Second, the DOJ's policy of self-restraint is patterned off its
own interpretation of what constitutes per se violations, not necessarily the courts'. This can (and has) lead to prosecution in the absence of prior case law establishing the conduct-at-issue as per se illegal.' 08 Put differently, even the DOJ's policy of self-restraint does
not actually preclude it from pursuing entirely novel antitrust theories-to the detriment of the unwary. Third, the probabilistic trend
created by this policy-punishing only a handful of offenders immensely-lessens the actual effect of any notice and clarity from a
behavioral standpoint vis-A-vis deterrence.' 9 In short, although the

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativelitigation/materials/20142014 sac/
2014_sac/usantitrustcriminalenforcement.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN23-JCAW].
108. The DOJ's treatment of no-poaching agreements between competitors provides
one such example. Compare DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR
HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3-4 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/

download [https://perma.cc/LJB6-MR4K] ("[N]o-poaching agreements among employers,
whether entered into directly or through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws. . . . Going forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally against
naked . . . no-poaching agreements."), with United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d
1030, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (declining, on a motion to dismiss, to apply per se analysis to a
no-poaching agreement, holding that "[a]t this stage .... the court simply cannot determine with certainty the nature of the restraint, and by extension, the level of analysis to
apply."), and Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying rule-ofreason analysis to a no-poaching agreement between a company and its former affiliates,
and noting in particular that "there are no Supreme Court cases nor any federal cases that
have applied the per se rule in similar factual circumstances").
109. See, e.g., WESTRICK, supra note 107, at 5 ("Some, including [DOJ Antitrust] alumni, have . . . proposed the theory that the ever-increasing weight of the 'stick' . . . may be

having a deterrent effect, not on cartel behavior, but rather, on self-reporting and cooperation."). For leading empirical criminologists reaching the same conclusion, but in a more
generalized context, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND
SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH (1999) (finding that certainty of

apprehension was associated with declining crime rates, and concluding that there was no
basis in existing research "for inferring that increasing the severity of sentences ... is capable of enhancing deterrent effects"); David P. Farrington et al., Changes in Crime and
Punishment in America, England and Sweden Between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 STUD. ON
CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 104-31 (1994) (finding no statistically significant relationship
between severity of punishment and crime rates); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 1975-2025 at 199-263 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2013); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsicity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865 (2001) ("[P]unishment certainty is far more consistently found to
deter crime than is punishment severity. . . .").
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DOJ's policy is in some respects admirable, it does not actually rebut

any of the vagueness issues raised in this Part with respect to the
Sherman Act. Finally, because this restraint on criminal application
is purely a matter of prosecutorial discretion, it does not, strictly
speaking, preclude arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as a
matter of law. Failure of the law itself to cabin the discretion of authorities is its own vagueness concern, regardless of whether authorities choose to fence themselves in voluntarily."0
It is worth emphasizing this last point in particular. Beyond concerns of notice alone, the malleability of Sherman Act doctrine leaves
the door open for arbitrary-if not discriminatory-enforcement.
Among the extra-legal influences on antitrust decisionmaking, scholars have emphasized the role of politics,"' connections and access to
decisionmakers, 112 and even capture by particular industry segments.11 3 Though quantitative data along these lines is naturally limited, it suggests at least some degree of disparity between particular
industries"1 4 and categories" 5 in terms of antitrust enforcement. This
is an increasingly pressing concern, moreover, as United States antitrust law contends with economic globalization. The mere potential
for vague antitrust laws to be used as a discriminatory weapon

110. If this were not the case, the practice of facial vagueness challenges-attacking the
law in all possible applications-would not be logically consistent. See, e.g., City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-64 (1999); see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER, THE ANTITRUST RELIGION (2007).
112. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The ChangingNature
of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1444 (1998) ("Knowledge of the decisionmakers, familiarity with current enforcement policy, even if unpublished, and access to the
agencies play a critical role . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
113. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the
Big Ideas Information Lecture on Regulation in High-Tech Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC 13-14 (Apr. 2, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public statements/634631/150402clemson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83BM-PC7L]
(observing that "[s]ome sets of producers are simply better organized and more politically
connected than others," and that "regulatory bodies are far more likely to be populated by
industry insiders with favorable inclinations towards older and outdated modes of doing
business").
114. See, e.g., MACLOLM B. COATE & SHAWN W. ULRICK, ECONOMIC ISSUES:
TRANSPARENCY AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: THE HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS 1996-2003, at 16 (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
request-mailed-copy-transparency-federal-trade-commission-horizontal-merger-reviewprocess- 1996-2003/0502economicissues- 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QPA-R74M]
(examining
merger review data from 1996 to 2003, and concluding that it "suggest[ed] differences in
the enforcement regimes faced by the . . . selected industries").
115.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED

HANDBOOK 792 (3d ed. 2016) ("A policy bias may also result in abandoning entire categories of antitrust violations . . . . During President Reagan's two terms, the Antitrust Division devoted almost all of its enforcement resources to two categories: merger enforcement
and horizontal violations of Section 1 . . . .").
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against foreign exporters may stymie economic accords and treaties"
and has already generated some degree of tension with respect to
China' 7 and the European Union."
In brief, the Sherman Act's text, historical pattern of implementation, and judicially-created framework all raise severe concerns as to
notice and consistency. Those concerns, on their face alone, may be
enough to find the Sherman Act void for vagueness, given modern
doctrine. But additional considerations and guiding principles tend to
motivate vagueness analysis. Among others, the severity of the statute's penalties, the overlap and tension with constitutionally protected activity, and the presence or absence of a limiting mens rea requirement. As the following three Parts examine, along each of these
additional dimensions the Sherman Act's constitutionality is only
more suspect.

III.

PENALTIES AND THE SHERMAN

ACT

The more severe the penalty, the less vagueness in the law will be
constitutionally tolerated. Where a small civil fine is at stake, the
courts tend to permit relatively broad and textually open-ended prohibitions. But where more severe sanctions-such as imprisonmentmay be applied, the courts tend to demand a high degree of clarity
and specificity. Over the years, as the Sherman Act's penalties have
been amended and enhanced, the Act has drifted further and further
towards the more demanding end of this spectrum. In short, the relatively stiff penalties associated with modern criminal antitrust lawaccompanied by the trends that, if anything, have decreased clarity
116.

See, e.g., COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY 137 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) ("As [World
Trade Organization] agreements progressively reduce tariff barriers, nations are likely to
use discriminatory competition laws as a nontariff barrier."); Andrew Guzman, The Case
for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 355, 356 (2004) ("Agencies will be
tempted to be lenient toward locals and tough on foreigners . . . even if no such double
standard is called for in the relevant legislation. . . . Ample evidence suggests that states
are, indeed, biased in their application of competition policy.").
117. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR THE PROT. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP.,
CURBING THE ABUSES OF CHINA'S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: AN INDICTMENT AND REFORM

AGENDA (2014), https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2014/04/Curbing-theAbuses-of-Chinas-Anti-Monopoly-Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHU4-T5PU]; Unequal Before
the Law?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/
2 1613348-chinas-antitrust-crackdown-turns-ugly-foreign-carmakers-forefront-unequal
[https://perma.cc/G2JM-5MG3].
118. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and IndustrialPolicy, 22
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2015) (noting a perceived "anti-American bias" in European antitrust enforcement, including empirical findings of "protectionism"); George L.
Priest & Franco Romani, The GE/Honeywell Precedent, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2001),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB992994589433979465 ("When the European Commission
states that politics will be irrelevant to its decision, it means the political efforts of the U.S.
and other countries wanting economic progress, not the politics of Rolls-Royces and Thales,
which hope for regulatory action to save them from the effects of aggressive competition.").
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and definiteness-render it particularly vulnerable to a vagueness
challenge.
A.

Penaltiesand Vagueness

As a rule, more process is due when the potential deprivationlife, liberty, or property-is greater." 9 On one end of this continuum,
minor civil deprivations-such as a public school suspension20
require only a simple, informal hearing.o
On the other end, in capital criminal cases, defendants must be afforded the highest standard
of formal trial procedures.' 2 ' Vagueness challenges, flowering out of
due process rights, have taken on the same characteristic:
The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as
the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement-depends
in part on the nature of the enactment.

. .

. The Court has .

.

. ex-

pressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. 2 2

In other words, because criminal sanctions may include not only financial penalties, but also "opprobrium," "stigma," and "years in
prison," statutes with criminal application are held to a far higher
standard of clarity.1 2 3 Purely civil laws, on the other hand, are only

rarely held to be void for vagueness.1 2 4
Even within the criminal and civil categories, vagueness concerns
correlate with the severity of potential punishment. A law that "nominally imposes only civil penalties. . . . [M]ay warrant a relatively

strict test" if it, for example, additionally relies on and enforces the

.

119. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by
this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (holding that due process guarantees "can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved"). See generally Niki Kuckes, Civil Due
Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 16 (2006) ("[D]ue process rights
fall on a continuum of greater and lesser deprivations . .
120. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
121. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding, more than thirty years before such a right was recognized for all criminal defendants in Gideon u. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), that "in a capital case ... it is the duty of the court ... to assign counsel").
122. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
(1982).
123. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).
124. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 163-64 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 548-49 (1973); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 590-91 (1967). See generally
David W. Gartenstein & Joseph F. Warganz, RICO's 'Pattern" Requirement: Void for
Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 509-10 ("[V]ery few civil statutes have been struck on
vagueness grounds . . . .").
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stigma associated with criminal drug activity.'2 5 And, among criminal
statutes, those triggering capital and felony punishment are scrutinized more heavily than ones involving only misdemeanors. "' In
short, as the consequences of inadvertent violations increase for citizens, so does the Court's skepticism of ill-defined legal boundaries.
With that factor in mind, the remainder of this Part looks to the
first major vagueness challenge to the Sherman Act and examines how
much the statutory penalties have since changed. Although this challenge failed, its precedential value in terms of the Sherman Act's
vagueness is severely undermined by the contrast in penalties at issue.
B.

Nash v. United States

In Nash v. United States,2 7 the Court upheld the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act against its first charges of unconstitutional
vagueness. Nash came on the heels of Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States 28 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.,129 two
cases credited with narrowing the literal terms of the Sherman Actprohibiting "every" contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade-to a prohibition against only "unreasonable" restraints of
trade.1 3 0 The defendant, accused of using complex vertical arrangements to fix prices and rig contract bids, argued that this holistic

125. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499-500 & n.16 (treating an Illinois ordinance requiring public registration to sell items "designed or marketed for use with illegal ...
drugs" as
"quasi-criminal" for purposes of vagueness analysis).

.

126. See, e.g., Gartenstein & Warganz, supra note 124, at 509 ("The degree of scrutiny to which statutes are subjected gradually diminishes as the potential penalty is reduced."); Jeffrey I. Tilden, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV.
1543, 1556 & n.68 (1981) (arguing that, in the Court's vagueness analysis, "due process
justifies attention to fairness commensurate with the penalty involved," and noting in
particular the high standard applied in "death penalty cases"); Robert H. Wright, Today's Scandal Can Be Tomorrow's Vogue: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 48 How. L.J. 659, 665 (2005) (noting that "the more
severe the penalty" among criminal statutes, "the more likely the Court is to invalidate
it on void for vagueness"); Stan Thomas Todd, Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal
Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 888
(1974) ("Actual application of vagueness doctrine in the context of ...
criminal law has
always been a flexible process. The extent of permissible vagueness in each case is a
function of . .. the severity of the sanction imposed . .
127. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
128. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
129. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
130. Id. at 178-79 ("[I]n the Standard Oil Case ...
it was held ...
that as the statute
had not defined the words restraint of trade, it became necessary to construe those words,
a duty which could only be discharged by a resort to reason."); Nash, 229 U.S. at 376
("Those cases may be taken to have established that only such contracts and combinations
are within the act as, by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts,
prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the
course of trade.").
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reasonableness approach rendered the statute unconstitutionally
vague. As the Court stated:
And thereupon it is said that the crime thus defined by the statute
contains in its definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with the result that a man might find himself in
prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent men. . . . "[T]he criminality of an act cannot
depend upon whether a jury may think it reasonable or unreasonable. There must be some definiteness and certainty ... .131

The Court rejected the vagueness argument, however, comparing the
Sherman Act to other valid matters of degree in criminal law:
But ...

the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on
. . some matter of degree. If his judgment is
wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as
here; he may incur the penalty of death. "An act causing death
may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the
degree of danger attending it" by common experience in the circumstances known to the actor. "The very meaning of the fiction of
implied malice in such cases at common law was, that a man
might have to answer with his life for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw." . . . If a man should kill another by
driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he might be convicted
of murder however little he expected the result. If he did no more
than drive negligently through a street he might get off with manslaughter or less. And in the last case he might be held although
his estimating rightly .

he himself thought that he was acting as a prudent man should.1 32
The Court offered little further elaboration, and its analysis is somewhat puzzling, at least in light of how vagueness doctrine is cast today. As explored broadly in Part II, vagueness is predicated on notice-notice that the conduct in question is prohibited.1 3 3 This kind of
notice is independent of "intending" or "foreseeing" physical cause
and effect. That is, a person may or may not intend to kill when they
drive wildly, but it is almost certain that they know, as a matter of
background information, that killing another person is illegal. The
Court's analysis thus conflates tolerating prosecution of an imprudent person who misappraises the riskiness of their actions with tolerating prosecution of a prudent person who misappraises the illegality of their conduct.
This odd side-step recurs multiple times in the Court's historical
treatment of vagueness cases. That trend, and its interaction with
antitrust law specifically, is addressed in detail in Part V's discussion
131.
1892)).
132.
133.

Nash, 229 U.S. at 376-77 (citing Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917, 919 (E.D. Mo.
Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.

736

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:3

of mens rea. The remainder of this Part is instead dedicated to briefly
highlighting how sharply the Sherman Act's penalties have increased
since Nash. Even assuming no other changes in doctrine, the sheer
magnitude of difference between the Sherman Act then and the
Sherman Act now clearly precludes reliance on Nash as precedential
authority with which to defeat a vagueness challenge.
C. The Sherman Act Today
"Although most enforcement actions are civil, the Sherman Act is
also a criminal law," enforced with severe penalties.1 34 Originally,
violations of the Act were "misdemeanor [s]," punishable "by fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars," by "imprisonment not exceeding
one year," or both.1 35 Nash, decided in 1913, involved these relatively small stakes. However, after multiple enhancing amendments in
1955,136 1974,137 and 1990,138 criminal violations of the Sherman Act
now constitute felonies exclusively, punishable by up to ten years
imprisonment and one million dollars in fines.1 39
These criminal penalties, moreover, are far from dead letter.
Even without further legislative enhancement or expansion, criminal antitrust prosecution by the DOJ has increased steadily since
the 1990s: the average number of individuals sentenced to prison
per year has doubled, and the average prison sentence received has
tripled.1 40 A majority of those sentenced under the Sherman Act receive prison time.1 4' And the reliance of the DOJ on incarceration
for antitrust offenses does not appear to be changing anytime
soon.1 42 In short, the potential deprivation of liberty and property at

134. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 104.
135. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
136. 69 Stat. 282 (1955).
137. 88 Stat. 1708 (1974).
138. 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Using CPI data to adjust for inflation, this constitutes up to a
ten-fold increase in monetary penalties in real-dollar terms.
140. Criminal Program Update 2015, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-program-update
[https://perma.cc/EC2B-CQJ6].
141. U.S.
SENTENCING
COMM'N,
2013
ANNUAL
REPORT,
at
tbl.12,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2013/Tablel2.pdf [https://perma.cc/44VB-QGQL].
142. Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Remarks on Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes 3 (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opalfile/826721/download
[https://perma.cc/X4HV-BP2T] ("This
emphasis on individual accountability is fundamental to Antitrust Division prosecutors.
The Division has long touted prison time for individuals as the single most effective deterrent to the 'temptation to cheat the system and profit from collusion.' ").
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stake is significant-and vagueness concerns are therefore particularly pressing.14 3
To be clear, the severity of punishment at issue is only one factor
among many in vagueness analysis. But coupled with the already
significant shortcomings of the Sherman Act's text and application in
terms of notice and consistency, the repeated penalty increases have
made the Act's constitutionality more precarious. Broadening the
analysis further, the next Part addresses a separate, though related
vagueness concern: the Sherman Act's increasing tension with constitutionally protected activity.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY
AND THE SHERMAN ACT

Distinct from the severity of penalties imposed, vagueness concerns are also magnified when the proscribed conduct borders-or
overlaps-with constitutionally protected activity. Laws implicating
First Amendment rights, in particular, are frequently subject to an
exacting vagueness analysis. As applied and interpreted today, the
Sherman Act exhibits much greater tension with constitutionally
protected freedoms, including First Amendment speech, than it once
did. This tension has manifested itself both directly-ranging from
boycotts and information exchanges to lobbying and lawsuits-as
well as indirectly, via second-order effects on growing information
and communication markets. Accordingly, any modern vagueness
analysis of the Sherman Act would be subject to these particularly
strict standards.
A.

ConstitutionallyProtectedActivity and Vagueness

Where the conduct at issue itself implicates constitutional concerns, vagueness can be particularly detrimental-and courts apply a
more demanding analysis as a result.1 44 In Colautti v. Franklin, for
143. Although a full international analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
worth drawing a brief comparison to the United Kingdom's competition laws. Cartelization,
for example, was long a civil-only offense. When the relevant laws were enhanced in 2002
to include criminal penalties, a heightened mens rea requirement was added as well. See
Enterprise Act 2002 §§ 188-202. That mens rea requirement was later slightly weakened
but supplemented by textually explicit safe harbor and defense provisions, such as disclosing the joint arrangement to customers. See COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, CARTEL
OFFENCE PROSECUTION GUIDANCE 3-4 (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachmentdatafile/288648/CMA9_Cartel OffenceProsecution Guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM85-B4UT]. The Sherman Act's multiple penalty enhancements, in
contrast, were not accompanied by any such offsets.

144. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
499 (1982) ("[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution
demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protect-

ed rights."); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) ("The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates
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example, the Supreme Court found a Pennsylvania statute requiring
"every person who performs or induces an abortion to make a determination, 'based on his experience, judgment or professional competence,' that the fetus is not viable" impermissibly vague.1 4 5 In so doing, the Court noted that the adverse effects of vagueness are especially strong "where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens
to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights,"'4 6 nodding
to the protections set forth in Roe v. Wade.14 7 Likewise, in Kolender v.
Lawson, the Court invalidated a California statute requiring "persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and
reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer."l4 8 Again, the Court highlighted the fact
that the statute in question "implicate[d] consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement."l49
First Amendment concerns are a particularly frequent trigger for
this type of enhanced scrutiny. The Court has found a number of
statutes implicating freedoms of speech and press,' 5 0 as well as assembly and association, ' 5 void for vagueness-always highlighting
the added danger of chilling constitutionally protected activity:
If the line drawn by the decree between the permitted and prohibited activities .

.

. is an ambiguous one, we will not presume that

the statute curtails constitutionally protected activity as little as
possible. For standards of permissible statutory vagueness are
strict in the area of free expression.

. .

. These freedoms are deli-

to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution.").
See generally Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 284 (2003) (noting that vagueness concerns are "especially
significant when the behavior is constitutionally protected, such as performing abortions or
engaging in protected speech"); Karen A. Goldman & Montgomery K. Fisher, The Constitutionality of the "Other Serious Deviation from Accepted Practices"Clause, 37 JURIMETRICS J.
149, 156 (1997) ("[L]aws that might inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights
are generally subject to the most stringent examination for vagueness . . . .").
145. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 386-91; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 451 (1983) (invalidating as vague part of an Ohio statute requiring that physicians
"insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane . . . manner").
Unlike other parts of the Akron decision, the vagueness analysis was not disturbed by
PlannedParenthoodof Se. Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
147. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

148. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983).
149. Id. at 358 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
150. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870-73 (1997); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578
(1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948).
151. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960).
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cate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions.1 2

That is, the Court has held that the mere existence of a vague statute
curtails expression-even expression that might not ultimately be
found to violate the statute-because "only . . . those hardy enough to
risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation"

will fully exercise their rights.15 3
It is worth noting that vagueness doctrine operates separate and
distinct from "overbreadth doctrine"-a line of analysis unique to
First Amendment jurisprudence:
The city correctly points out that imprecise laws can be attacked

on their face under two different doctrines. First, the overbreadth
doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications
of the law are substantial when "judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
612-15 (1973). Second, even if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be
impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the
police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary
deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,

358 (1983).154
As outlined in the following Sections, the Sherman Act exhibits substantial overlap and tension with First Amendment protections, making an overbreadth challenge at least hypothetically possible. A full,
separate overbreadth analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this
Article. The implications for vagueness analysis are clear: the Sherman Act is particularly suspect.
B.

National Dairy Products Corporation v. United States

Fifty years after Nash, United States v. National Dairy Products
Corp. 166 brought a new vagueness challenge to the antitrust laws.
Somewhat inadvertently, it also provides the Supreme Court's only
explicit foray, however brief, into the intersection of antitrust,
vagueness, and constitutionally protected activity. In National Dairy,
the defendants were accused of engaging in predatory pricingdefined as selling at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of de152. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 433 (1963). See generally Gartenstein & Warganz, supra note 124, at 513 n.177 (collecting subsequent cases); Note, The ChillingEffect in
Constitutional Law, 69 COLuM. L. REV. 808 (1969) (analyzing the first vagueness cases to
explicitly contemplate a "chilling effect").
153. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
154. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
155. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
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stroying competition or eliminating a competitor"-in violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act.1 6 In district court, they successfully moved for
dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the law's prohibition
on "unreasonably low prices" was unconstitutionally vague. 5 7
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed, and reversed the
district court's decision. In particular, the Court noted that prior cases applying the Robinson-Patman Act-and even the Sherman Acthad long established the illegal nature of defendant's particular conduct.15 Moreover, due to the defendants' citations to multiple First
Amendment vagueness cases in its brief,'5 9 the Court also went on to
distinguish the conduct at issue in this case from those higherscrutiny types of cases:
In this connection we also note that the approach to "vagueness"
governing a case like this is different from that followed in cases
arising under the First Amendment. There we are concerned with
the vagueness of the statute "on its face" because such vagueness
may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable
conduct. No such factor is present here where the statute is directed
only at conduct designed to destroy competition, activity which is
neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. . . . The reliance . . . on First Amendment cases is therefore misplaced.16 0

This brief paragraph offers the only explicit commentary from the
Court on antitrust vagueness vis-a-vis the First Amendment, but it
may be tied to a broader historical trend. That is, when the Court
labels a statute as "purely economic"-as opposed to encompassing
constitutionally protected conduct-it comfortably applies a less
searching vagueness inquiry.161 Although the Court has never explicitly labeled the Sherman Act as "purely economic," the suggestion
that it and the other antitrust laws are "directed only at conduct designed to destroy competition" is quite close and might reasonably
lead one to believe that a lax vagueness analysis applies to the
156.

Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1528 (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§

13(a)). The Robinson-

Patman Act was an amendment and addition to the Clayton Act. See generally supra note 2
(explaining and comparing the scope of each of the antitrust statutes).
157. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 31. The motion was granted orally, and no
opinion below was rendered. See Brief for the United States, Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 1961 WL 102236, at *1.
158. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 33-35.
159. See Brief for Appellees, Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 1962 WL 115429
(citing, for example, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
160. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 36 (citations omitted).
161. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974); see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (observing
that the Court "appl[ies] a less rigorous vagueness analysis" to purely economic regulations); Sohoni, supra note 6, at 1189 ("In the decades following the New Deal, it became
uncontroversial to announce that 'purely economic regulation' was subject to a less stringent vagueness standard.").
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Sherman Act.1 6 2 As the next Section explores, however, "constitutionally protected" and "socially desirable" activities frequently lie in the
Sherman Act's path as well; the "purely economic" label simply could
not stick today.
C.

The Sherman Act Today

The underlying view in National Dairy that the antitrust laws do
not implicate constitutionally protected activity is antiquated at
best, particularly with respect to the Sherman Act. Even prior to
National Dairy, jurists recognized the clear interplay between the
Sherman Act and speech. In American Column & Lumber Co., for
example, a dissenting Justice Holmes commented on the ramifications of the majority's holding that section 1 prevents sellers from
sharing price information:
I must add that the decree as it stands seems to me surprising in a
country of free speech that affects to regard education and
knowledge as desirable. It prohibits the distribution of stock, production, or sales reports, the discussion of prices at association
meetings, and the exchange of predictions of high prices.... I cannot believe that the fact, if it be assumed, that the acts have been
done with a sinister purpose, justifies excluding mills in the backwoods from information .... 163

The Court's opinion shortly thereafter in Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, seemingly minimizing American Column, echoed this theme:
Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in
trade journals and statistical reports . . . are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade . . . for the simple reason that

the Sherman Law neither repeals economic laws nor prohibits the
gathering and dissemination of information.1 64

This back-and-forth would prove to be prescient of future Sherman
Act decisions crafting a fine line between permissible and impermissible information exchange, a recurring theme in the jurisprudence.1 65 Meanwhile, the Court has increasingly recognized that the
"sale, disclosure, and use of' commercial information is, in fact,
speech protected by the First Amendment-rejecting the notion that
162. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 36.
163. Am. Column & Lumber Co., 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
164. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584 (1925).
165. Compare United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (treating
information exchange as price fixing, and therefore a Sherman Act violation per se), with
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (treating information exchange as
conduct within the rule of reason). For a more recent example of information exchange as
potentially triggering criminal liability, see United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.,
No. 92-2854 (SSH), 1994 WL 502091 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1994).
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such information is "a mere 'commodity' with no greater entitlement
to First Amendment protection than 'beef jerky.' "166 These two
trends, taken together, render National Dairy's suggestion that no
constitutionally protected or socially desirable conduct would be at
issue under the Sherman Act particularly suspect.
The case law governing boycotts provides another direct link between the Sherman Act and the First Amendment. As noted earlier, '67 although Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & PrintingCo. 68 and Federal Trade Commission v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n169 are in some tension, the holding that the

Sherman Act prohibits at least some boycotts remains clear. At the
same time, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment generally protects boycotts:
In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The established elements of speech, assembly, association,
and petition, "though not identical, are inseparable." Through exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring
about political, social, and economic change.

[T]he petitioners clearly foresaw-and directly intended-that
the merchants would sustain economic injury as a result of their

campaign. 170

Hence, as with the rules governing information exchange, a fine
line now separates constitutionally protected and illegally anticompetitive boycott activity.' 7' As the Court itself has recognized,
"[e]xactly what types of activity fall within the forbidden category
is, however, far from certain." 7 2 As a result, there is a clear risk of
"chilling effect [s]" due to the "imprecise contours" of antitrust boycott doctrine.1 7 3
In at least one instance, the tension between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act has been so direct as to necessitate a judicially-created bright-line carveout. Specifically, the Supreme Court
has established that the First Amendment's protection of the right to
petition grants presumptive immunity from liability under the antitrust laws for "attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
166.
167.
168.
169.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557, 570 (2011).
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
493 U.S. 411 (1990).

170. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911, 914 (1982) (citations omitted).
171. See generally Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1229-31.
172. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 294.
173. Beschle, supra note 84, at 421.
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laws."174 This immunity applies even when a suit is brought with
overtly anticompetitive intent,' 7 5 so long as it is not an "objectively

baseless" sham.7 6 But this narrow exception does little to relieve
the tension overall. In all other cases, it would not alter the typical
Sherman Act analysis at all-a detailed, fact-intensive inquiry into economic motivation and effects. 7 7
Moving beyond direct implication of speech, it is worth taking
into account the Sherman Act's second-order effects on information and communication markets as markets. Whether directed
at old media (such as the Associated Press's news 78 ) or new (such
7
as Google's search results"'
), antitrust law necessarily implicates
and affects speech insofar as it imposes regulation. To be clear,
this is not precisely the same as a chilling effect-here, the user or
original author is one step removed from antitrust scrutiny, and
hence not incorporating the threat of antitrust penalties into their
decision to exercise speech. But the First Amendment concerns are
analogous: if the threat of antitrust prosecution "chills" the ownership or creation of platforms for speech, downstream users are no
less marginalized or curtailed in their speech. This is perhaps
most directly embodied by the proposals

80

(and attempts ' 8 ) to

174. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
175. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act. The jury should have been so instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of this evidence, we cannot hold this lapse to be
mere harmless error.").
176. Profl Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
177. Compare Missouri v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (finding no boycott-based Sherman Act violation), with
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (finding a boycott-based Sherman
Act violation). See generally Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products,
Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 50 (2015) (arguing that "the First Amendment has never been successfully invoked to modify antitrust assessment" outright, with
Noerr-Penningtonas the "one exception").
178. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
179. Compare Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection
for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 884 (2012) (arguing that
Google's search results would be exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny), with Kurt Wimmer,
The Proper Standard for Constitutional Protection of Internet Search Practices (Jan. 17,
2014), http://www.mediainstitute.org/mediacompolicy/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/FirstAmendment-Issues-in-Search-and-Antitrust-6-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEQ8-U54W] (reaching the opposite conclusion).
180. See, e.g., Aleksandra Gebicka & Andreas Heinemann, Social Media & Competition
Law, 37 WORLD COMPETITION 149 (2014); Lisa P. Goldstein et al., Antitrust in High-Tech
Industries, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071, 1079-87 (2012); John M. Newman, Antitrust in
Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015); Spencer Weber Waller,
Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771 (2012).
181. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
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bring antitrust law to bear on concentrations of social networking
media. But it encompasses even prosaic platforms as well. In Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., for example, the court needed
to determine whether the decision of several trade publications to not
publish certain advertisements was truly anticompetitive, or merely
motivated by a desire to project a certain "image" of the "industry as
a whole." 8 2

These examples all highlight not only the interplay between constitutionally protected activity and the Sherman Act, but also the extent to which that interplay is fraught with ambiguity. Bright-line
carveouts are minimal and narrow; the answers to questions of liability are complex, shifting, and case-specific. The second-order effects
on information and communication markets are less concretely defined, but at a minimum further undermine the dated notion that the
Sherman Act does not impact constitutionally protected activity. Accordingly, the Sherman Act today would be subject to a particularly
high standard of clarity and consistency-one that it cannot meet for
all the reasons given thus far. With those shortcomings in mind, the
following Part turns to one last factor in vagueness analysis: scienter.
V.

MENS REA AND THE SHERMAN ACT

In addition to the penalties at stake and the conduct at issue,
whether or not the law incorporates a requirement of mens rea
strongly influences vagueness analysis. The courts tend to view these
scienter constraints-the need for a guilty mind-as not only narrowing the statute's scope, but also undermining any claim that the law
has simply trapped the unwary or uninformed. Conversely, statutes
without mens rea requirements are held to a much greater standard
of clarity. In the most recent vagueness challenge to the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court created a mens rea requirement as a matter
of constitutional necessity. As this Part examines, however, that requirement has been hollowed out in practice to the point of being
moot-where it has not been eliminated explicitly.
A.

Mens Rea and Vagueness

The Supreme Court "has long recognized that the constitutionality
of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that
standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea."1 8 3 In Screws v.
United States, Justice Douglas provided perhaps the most explicit
rationale for this close relation:

182. Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 491 F.3d 380, 393 (8th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 552. U.S. 1040 (2007).
183. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
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The Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to
the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite
statute invalid. The constitutional vice in such a statute is the essential injustice to the accused of placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of
which it gives no warning. But where the punishment imposed is
only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that
which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer
from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a
violation of law. The requirement that the act must be willful or
purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory
definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it
does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without
warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.1 84

Put differently, the Court has reasoned that the inclusion of a mens
rea requirement reduces the likelihood of an individual being subject
to penalty without notice, thereby mitigating the due process concerns associated with vagueness. 8 5
Conversely, when no such mens rea requirement can be found in
the statute at issue, the Court's examination becomes quite strict.
The opinion in Colautti v. Franklin is once again illustrative; there,
"[b]ecause of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision
directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be
viable," the Court found the statute in question to be "little more
than 'a trap for those who act in good faith.' "186 A requirement of
mens rea, in the Court's eye, would have helped to counterbalance
"the uncertainty of the viability determination itself":

184.
185.

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 21 (2010) ("And the

knowledge requirement of the statute further reduces any potential for vagueness . . . .");
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (noting that mens rea "blunts any notice
concern[s]"); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007) ("The Court has made clear that
scienter requirements alleviate vagueness concerns."); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732
(2000) ("[The [vagueness] concern is ameliorated by the fact that § 18-9-122(3) contains a
scienter requirement. The statute only applies to a person who 'knowingly' approaches
within eight feet of another, without that person's consent, for the purpose of engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling."); see also Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the
Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 364 (2012) ("[I]f the same law overlays a
mens rea or scienter requirement, said liability only attaches when the defendant can be
faulted for the transgression, perhaps for acting negligently, recklessly, willfully, or with
full knowledge that he or she was within the forbidden zone."); Ryan McCarl, Incoherent
and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Supreme Court's "Void-forVagueness" Doctrine, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 73, 80 (2014) ("[A] criminal statute that
includes a[n] ... intent (or mens rea) requirement is less likely to encompass morally innocent conduct, and so more likely to accord with people's intuitions about what conduct is

illegal.").
186. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) (quoting United States v. Ragen,
314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942)).
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As the record in this case indicates, a physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after considering a number of variables:
the gestational age of the fetus, derived from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the woman's general
health and nutrition; the quality of the available medical facilities;
and other factors. Because of the number and the imprecision of
these variables, the probability of any particular fetus' obtaining
meaningful life outside the womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the record indicates that even if agreement may
be reached on the probability of survival, different physicians
equate viability with different probabilities of survival, and some
physicians refuse to equate viability with any numerical probabil7
ity at all. 8

Numerous commentators have noted the logical flaws in using mens
rea as a replacement for actual notice through clarity. In brief, having the intent to perform a certain action or achieve a certain result
is not coterminous with having the intent to violate the law itself.' 8 8
For example, if a road has no speed limit signs posted, one may fully
intend to drive sixty miles per hour-but that says little about
whether there was adequate notice that the speed limit was actually
fifty miles per hour.' 89

187. Id. at 395-96 (footnote omitted).
188. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law. I do not suppose the Court
intends to suggest that if petitioner knew nothing of the existence of such a regulation its
ignorance would constitute a defense."); GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY 187 (Laura Pineschi ed. 2015) (arguing that "knowledge of the criminality of the
conduct . . . should be the correct focus" for mens rea to actually ameliorate vagueness concerns); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing
Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 7 (1997) ("[T]his rule makes sense only if the requirement is
that the defendant knew or should have known he was behaving unlawfully. Any other mens
rea requirement, even that the defendant specifically intended to do the conduct . . . would
give no guarantee that the defendant had fair warning that the conduct was a crime." (footnote omitted)); Gartenstein & Warganz, supra note 124, at 514 n.194 ("A finding of scienter
should not cure a notice problem, because it does not show that the defendant knew . .. what
conduct was prohibited by the statute."); Lockwood, supra note 13, at 413 ("[W]hen a court
uses a mens rea requirement as a substitute for notice, the court dilutes the fair notice requirement because a scienter requirement in the law does not guarantee that the law is
clearly written."); Sohoni, supra note 6, at 1194 ("Logically speaking, mens rea and clarity
are apples and oranges . . . . The presence of a mens rea requirement in a criminal statute
cannot make otherwise unclear statutory language clear as to what it prohibits."); Mario
Cerame, Note, The Right to Record Police in Connecticut, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 385, 440
(2012) ("Given the divided state of case law, it is not clear if intent to record police would
constitute intent to exercise a constitutional right. This mens rea probably does not provide
fair warning to a reasonable citizen-recorder acting in good faith."); Maureen L. Rurka,
Comment, The Vagueness of Partial-BirthAbortion Bans: Deconstruction or Destruction?,
89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1253-54 (1999).
189. If anything, one might reasonably infer a lack of knowledge of that fact, if one
assumes that most people endeavor to comply with the law.
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The only situation in which this logical gap is closed is where the
mens rea requirement is the intent to break the law itself. The laws
governing federal tax fraud provide such an example. Under 26
U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7203, governing failure to file an income tax return and attempting to evade income taxes, respectively, the defendant must have actually known that his or her conduct was illegal:
In this case, if [the defendant] asserted that he truly believed that
the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury believed him, the Government would not have
carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a
court might deem such a belief.

It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of
[the defendant's] understanding that, within the meaning of the
tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as
such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be.' 90

Tax fraud is not alone in this regard.' 9 ' The defendant's knowledge of
the law itself is a prerequisite to criminally prosecute, for example,
bank deposit structuring, 9 2 food stamp misuse, 193 copyright violations,1 9 4 and even obstruction of justice. 9 5
Nevertheless, an unbroken thread of Supreme Court precedent
stretching back almost one hundred years confirms that mens rea
still provides a strong defense against vagueness challenges-even
mens rea short of knowledge that the conduct is illegal.'9 6 This Arti190. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202, 203 (1991).
191. See generally Stephen F. Smith, ProportionalMens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127,
131 & n.21 (2009) (collecting cases).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012); see Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146 (1994) ("In
light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of
the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring.").
193. 7 U.S.C. § 2024 (2012); see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)
(holding that a "knowledge-of-illegality requirement" applies to 7 U.S.C. § 2024).
194. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). Although the Supreme Court has not weighed in on
the issue, "[a] majority of the courts have interpreted [§ 506(a)(1)] to mean that the government must show that the defendant specifically intended to violate copyright law." Lisa
Andrukonis et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1489 & nn.26364 (2016); see, e.g., Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2010);
Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Manzer, 69
F.3d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir.
1980).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012); see Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696,
702 (2005) (requiring "consciousness of wrongdoing" to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
196. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 n.17 (1980) ("[T]he Hyde Amendment
is not void for vagueness because ... [it] contains a clear scienter requirement under which
good-faith errors are not penalized . . . ."); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342
U.S. 337, 342 (1952) ("The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regula-
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cle, accordingly, assumes that the doctrinal thread remains good law.
Though keeping the aforementioned logical flaws in mind, the following Sections instead examine the Sherman Act's mens rea requirement as created by the Court and analyze whether that requirement
remains legally operative and practically salient.
B.

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Company

Only fifteen years after National Dairy, United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.'9 7 would provide the next key vagueness challenge to the
Sherman Act and the Supreme Court's most recent holding on that
issue. Once again, the Court did not find the challengers' arguments
persuasive, but this time, on more curious grounds, the Sherman
Act's mens rea requirement. To be clear, the text of the Sherman Act
does not include a mens rea requirement; on its face, there is no language addressing or referring to intent, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence. Nevertheless, the Gypsum Court read a mens rea requirement into the Sherman Act, finding it necessary in order to save
the Act against the claim of vagueness.
The Gypsum defendants were accused of using "interseller price
verification"-that is, "the practice of telephoning a competing manufacturer to determine the price being currently offered . . . to a specific customer"-in order to ensure matching cartel prices at a fixed level. 9 8 The Court took issue with the jury instructions given by the trial court, which charged: "[I]f the effect of the exchanges of pricing
information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the
parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended
that result."'9 9 The Court rejected this essentially "strict-liability" approach, due explicitly to the considerable ambiguity in the Act:
The Sherman Act, unlike most traditional criminal statutes, does
not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the conduct

which it proscribes.... Nor has judicial elaboration of the Act always yielded the clear and definitive rules of conduct which the
statute omits; instead open-ended and fact-specific standards like
the "rule of reason" have been applied to broad classes of conduct

tion. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the
offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation
would be so unfair that is must be held invalid."); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266

U.S. 497, 502-03 (1925) ("[S]ince the statutes require a specific intent to defraud ...

the

hazard of prosecution which appellants fear loses whatever substantial foundation it might
have in the absence of such a requirement."); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348
(1918) ("Furthermore, any danger ...
which might otherwise arise from indefiniteness, is
removed by § 6314 . . . which provides that . . . 'there must exist a union, or joint operation,
of act and intent, or criminal negligence.' ").

197. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
198. Id. at 422.
199. Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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falling within the purview of the Act's general provisions. Simply
put, the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has been construed to have a "generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu2

tional provisions."o o

Due to the Sherman Act's ambiguity, the Court explained, there was
a significant risk of punishing "good-faith error[s] of judgment," in
turn leading to "overdeterrence" of "socially acceptable and economi20
cally justifiable business conduct."o
The solution the Court found
was to read into the Act an otherwise absent mens rea requirement:
"[W]e conclude that action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be
a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws."202
The Gypsum Court's decision to create a mens rea requirement in
the Sherman Act was not, it should be emphasized, based on the text
of the Act itself. To reiterate, the Sherman Act forbids "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 20 3 And "[e]very person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony," without mention or reference to
state of mind. 2 04 The Court's decision, moreover, contravened the
Act's legislative history as well. After the addition of a mens rea requirement to Senator Sherman's original bill by the Finance Committee, the change was heavily criticized in debate for allegedly making
it "impossible . . . to produce a conviction."205 The mens rea requirement was, accordingly, later specifically removed.206 The Gypsum
Court does not discuss this or any aspect of the Sherman Act's legislative history. Absent either a textual or legislative hook, the Court's
decision appears to rely wholly, yet implicitly, on the interpretive

200. Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted) (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)).
201. Id. at 441. In its analysis, the Court found its prior decisions-ones more dismissive of vagueness concerns-unpersuasive to the contrary. Id. at 439 (discussing Nash
v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)).
202. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444.
203. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. 21 CONG. REC. 1767 (1890); see S. 1, 51st Cong. § 1 (as reported by Sen. Sherman,
Jan. 14, 1890) (criminalizing arrangements made "with the intention to prevent full and
free competition" (emphasis omitted)).
206. See S. 1, 51st Cong. § 1 (as proposed by Sen. Sherman, Mar. 18, 1890) (criminalizing arrangements made "which tend to prevent full and free competition").

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

750

[Vol. 45:3

canon of avoiding unconstitutionality.20 7 Put differently, the lengths
to which the Court was willing to go to create a mens rea requirement indicates just how vulnerable the Sherman Act otherwise was
to a vagueness challenge at the time. It thus appears fair to say that
the Sherman Act-at least in its 1978 iteration and implementation-could not have survived a vagueness challenge without that
2 08
mens rea requirement.

Gypsum, of course, involved a less severe iteration of the Sherman
Act than its contemporary form-to wit, like in Nash, the Gypsum
defendants were risking only misdemeanor convictions.2 0 9 The Court
has not addressed whether the mens rea requirement should accordingly be higher for the felony convictions now possible under the Act.
Indeed, it remains questionable whether any mens rea level would be
sufficient to save the criminal application of the Sherman Act given
its increased penalties and increased contact with constitutionally
protected activity over the past four decades. 2'0 The following Section
tackles a somewhat narrower, and in many ways simpler, inquiry
instead: to what extent is the mens rea requirement that was created
to save the Sherman Act still functional or operative?
C.

The Sherman Act Today

Whereas the mens rea requirement set forth by Gypsum may have
ameliorated vagueness concerns at the time, its effect has since been
significantly limited in two key respects. First, the mens rea requirement does not apply to per se violations-a category which, as
discussed in Part II, has become significantly blurred. Second, actually implementing the mens rea requirement for offenses governed by
the rule of reason has proved impracticable, circular, and vacuous.

207.

See generally Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding

Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015) (explaining the history and practical
use of the canon of avoiding unconstitutionality).
208. Indeed, the Court's approach in Gypsum may be contrasted directly with the
Court's discussion of scienter as a textual requirement in the Robinson-Patman Act in National Dairy:

Finally, we think the additional element of predatory intent alleged in the indictment and required by the Act provides further definition of the prohibited
conduct.... The Act here ...
listed as elements of the illegal conduct not only
the intent to achieve a result-destruction of competition-but also the actselling at unreasonably low prices-done in furtherance of that design or purpose. It seems clear that the necessary specificity of warning is afforded when,
as here, separate, though related, statutory elements of prohibited activity
come to focus on one course of conduct.

United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 35 (1963).
209.

See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.

210.

See supra Parts III & IV.
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On the first point, every circuit to address the question has explicitly narrowed Gypsum's mens rea requirement to rule-of-reason cases.2 1 ' While the Supreme Court has never endorsed this approach
outright, it has rejected certiorari on all such cases. As the Second
Circuit explained:
Since the per se rule makes certain conspiracies illegal without regard to their actual effects on trade, it would be illogical to refuse
to allow a jury to consider whether the defendant's acts had resulted in an unreasonable restraint, on the one hand, and then require
it to find the specific intent to produce those effects, on the other.

Where per se conduct is found ...

a requirement that intent ...

en-

vision actual anti-competitive results would reopen the very ques-

tions of reasonablenesswhich the per se rule is designed to avoid.2 1 2
But given the aforementioned blurring between per se and rule-ofreason offenses, this limitation placed on Gypsum's holding is no
longer justifiable. That is, to the extent courts engage in rule-ofreason analysis as a step-zero inquiry on per se cases, 2 1 3 the "questions of reasonableness" are already open; it is inconsistent at best to
not extend that inquiry to the matter of intent as well. Moreover, given the DOJ's policy of pursuing criminal charges only for per se offenses, 2 1 4 cabining application of the mens rea requirement to rule-ofreason cases generates a truly counterintuitive result: intent needs to
be proved in civil cases only. Because vagueness concerns scale with
the severity of punishment at issue-particularly between criminal
and civil penalties 2 1 5-this narrowing of Gypsum's mens rea requirement largely undermines whatever vagueness-mitigating effect it
might have had.
Even if the mens rea requirement were extended to per se offenses, however, that would do little to resolve vagueness concerns in
practice. The "knowledge" requirement implemented by Gypsum is
inherently fraught given the nature of competitive markets. As the
Gypsum Court stated:

211. United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 295 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 866 (1979); United States v. W.F. Brinkley & Son Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 1157,
1162 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676, 683 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc.
845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598
F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Metro. Enters., Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 449-50 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Giordano, 261 F.3d 1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2001).
212. Koppers, 652 F.2d at 296 n.6 (emphasis added).
213. See supra Section II.B.2.
214. See supra Section II.B.3.
215. See supra Section III.A.
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Our question ...
is whether a criminal violation of the antitrust
laws requires, in addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a
demonstration that the disputed conduct was undertaken with the
"conscious object" of producing such effects, or whether it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to have been undertaken with
2
knowledge that the proscribed effects would most likely follow.

16

The Court decided on the latter, creating the mens rea requirement of knowledge of probable "anticompetitive
effects."
"[A]nticompetitive effects," in turn, typically refers to "increased
prices and decreased output"2 17-the classic economic markers of a
more monopolistic equilibrium.
But focusing on effects is myopic; participants in a competitive
market always seek these effects, directly or otherwise. That is, an
economically rational company always wants to generate the greatest
possible profit,218 and the profits associated with being a monopolist
are, all else being equal, greater than competitive-market profits due
precisely to reduced output and increased price.2 19 The end goal of a
greater market share and fewer competitors are, therefore, universally desirable-only the means taken to that end may be feasibly distinguished. Judge Learned Hand recognized this tension early on, in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America:
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly,
the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces
which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
upon when he wins.

220

216. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
217. Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1992); see, e.g.,
Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 121 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Injury to competition
'is usually measured by a reduction in output and an increase in prices in the relevant market.'" (emphasis omitted)); W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100
(3d Cir. 2010) ("Anticompetitive effects include increased prices [and] reduced output . . . .").
218. See, e.g., R. PRESTON MCAFEE & TRACY R. LEWIS, INTRODUCTION To ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 107 (2009) ("The basic theory of the firm regards the firm as a mechanism ... for
transforming materials into valuable goods and to maximize profits.").
219. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 224 (10th ed. 2008); N. GREGORY MANKIW & MARK P. TAYLOR, ECONOMICS 301
(2006); SAMPAT MUKHERJEE, MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 426 (4th ed. 2002); TIBOR
SCITOVSKY, WELFARE & COMPETITION: THE ECONOMICS OF A FULLY EMPLOYED ECONOMY
381-85 (2013).
220. 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). Finis opus coronat means
"[t]he end crowns the work." Finis Coronat Opus, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/finis%/`20coronat%/`200pus [https://perma.cc/7VFT-8XDK].
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Put more directly, if the culpable state of mind is defined as knowing that one's conduct will shut down or exclude a competitor, paving
the way to restricting output and increasing price, that does nothing
to limit the practical application of the Sherman Act:
driven desire to succeed and glee at a rival's predicament. . .

.

Almost all evidence bearing on "intent" tends to show both greed-

'

[D]rive to succeed lies at the core of a rivalrous economy. Firms
need not like their competitors; they need not cheer them on to
success; a desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely consistent
with, often is the motive behind, competition.2 2

This problem is somewhat exceptional to antitrust. Not everyone who
gets into a physical fight intends to kill; not everyone who tells an untruth intends to deceive. But "the market economy relies on the selfinterest of the businessman, in seeking to maximize profits," 2 2 2 increase market share, and extract greater surplus. Antitrust law, therefore, can proscribe only certain methods of achieving those goals. And
if those proscriptions are vague, Gypsum's ends-based mens rea requirement does not actually add specificity or limitation. These logical
shortcomings are reflected in the practical difficulties created by Gypsum's framework: for at least the reasons given above, intent to destroy competition through anticompetitive means is largely indistinguishable from the legitimate intent to do so competitively. 223
Contrast Gypsum with the aforementioned mens rea requirement
for criminal tax violations-"voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty." 2 2 4 Much as a rational firm generally intends to
maximize profits, a rational taxpayer generally intends to minimize
tax liability.2 25 Hence, defining a mens rea requirement for criminal
tax violations as knowledge of the probable effect of paying less money to the government would not actually cabin culpability. Instead,
221. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1989) (emphasis added); see also Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989)
("Evidence of predatory intent alone can be ambiguous or misleading.").
222. Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 385 (1965).
223. See William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech III, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of
Intent, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 293, 302 n.30 (1993) ("As a casual look at the business trade
press will show, businessmen often use sports or military language. Thus, aggressive
memos are expected. Finding such documents, without more, is not necessarily evidence of
predatory intent."); Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs us. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 646 (2005) ("[Fliery language used by a company's employees
sheds no light on the legality or competitive effects of its conduct.").
224. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); see supra notes 190-95 and
accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 617, 623 (2015); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556-57 (1998).
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by centering the mens rea requirement on a known legal duty, criminal tax law not only avoids Gypsum's misstep, but also addresses the
notice and clarity concerns associated with vagueness directlynotice to the defendant is effectively a prerequisite to prosecution.2 2 6
Justice Stevens advocated for precisely such an approach towards the
Sherman Act in Gypsum:
In 1955 I subscribed to the view that criminal enforcement of the
Sherman Act is inappropriate unless the defendants have deliberately violated the law. I adhere to that view today....
If I were fashioning a new test of criminal liability, I would require
proof of a specific purpose to violate the law rather than mere
knowledge that the defendants' agreement has had an adverse effect on the market.2 2 7

That approach was nevertheless rejected by the majority.
Even setting aside the flaws intrinsic to Gypsum's "knowledge"
standard, sheer complexity in Sherman Act doctrine may necessitate
a stricter mens rea requirement. Consider, as a final example, the
mens rea distinction between civil and criminal copyright enforcement-again, the presence of an intent to violate the law.2 2' Determining whether a given work will infringe a purportedly copyrighted
work is-unless word-for-word plagiarism has taken place-an extraordinarily complex task, such that it would be almost unthinkable
to criminalize copyright infringement without it. To start, copyright
law protects only "expressions," not "ideas,""2 2 and distinguishing between the two can at times seem an exercise in deeply ambiguous
philosophy. As Judge Learned Hand stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.

226. See sources cited supranote 196.
227. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 474-75 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
228. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012); see supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012); see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 304 (1996) ("[C]opyright doctrine posits a dichotomy
between protectable expression and unprotected ideas. While a work's aesthetic form falls
within the province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, the ideas that the work
evokes or seeks to convey are free for all to use."); Alfred C. Yen, A FirstAmendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and
Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
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Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can. 2 30

Since copyright protection-unlike, say, patents-involves no preapproval application or grant process, content creators seeking to
avoid infringing are the first to examine the validity of purported copyrights. 2 3 1 In other words, before publishing a creative work, creators
are effectively asked to untangle the platonic knot expressed above to
discern whether adjacent creations pose a copyrightable threat. Next,
even where a copyright is valid, the other work must be "substantially
similar" to constitute infringement-a requirement so standardless
and free-form in practice that "it may seem like courts are going by an
'I know it when I see it' means to determine similarity." 2 32
Moreover, fair use2 33 -the key defense to copyright infringementis "extremely uncertain" in application, and "calls for [a] flexible,
case-by-case analysis." 23 4 As the Court itself has stated: "The task is
230. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citing Holmes
v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899)). Modern cases still rely on Judge Hand's levels-ofabstraction analysis. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990);
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615-16 (7th Cir. 1982).
231. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1013 (1997) ("Copyright law does not require examination by the government or the 'issuance' of a copyright; instead, original works of authorship are protected
immediately upon their creation.").
232. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1375, 1376-77 (2007)
(observing that "courts have created a variety of conflicting and often times confusing
tests," that are "complicated and vague," as well as "appl[ied] ... inconsistently and incorrectly"); see also Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness
of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 735 (1987) (describing the "substantial similarity" analysis as "leav[ing] the courts with an ad hoc, subjective approach that is
not workable or fair"); Katherine Lippman, The Beginning of the End: PreliminaryResults
of an Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions in the U.S. Circuit
Courts, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 515 ("[C]onfusion arises from an absence of uniform judicial language, difficulty results from the lack of a single substantial similarity test . . . , and
complexity surfaces when subject matter poles apart . . . are adjudicated by the same
standard."); Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward A Better Understandingof Substantial Similarity
in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000) ("The indeterminacy
and misapplication of tests for copyright infringement has led to great confusion as to what
substantial similarity means among courts and commentators alike."); B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests in Copyright
Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 491-92 (2001) ("[T]here appears to be an everpresent potential for confusion regarding the proper application of one or more of the various similarity tests . . . .").
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright.").
234. Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1718 (1999); see also Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 1087, 1092 (2007) ("[A]scertaining the scope of fair use ex ante is sufficiently uncertain that the doctrine is not effectively fulfilling its important function."); Jessica Litman,
Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 612 (1997)
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not to be simplified with bright-line rules . . . ."235 To wit, not unlike
the rule of reason, courts (and hence creators) are expected to correctly weigh and balance:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to

the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
236
the copyrighted work.

On the fourth factor in particular, the Court wades into
quite familiar to antitrust: "It requires courts to consider
the extent of market harm caused by the [defendant],
'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort

territory
not only
but also
engaged

in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the . . . market.' "237

Given the sum of uncertainties faced by content creators working
in the shadow of copyright law, the mens rea for criminal infringement is understandably high. Indeed, scholars have rightly questioned whether copyright law's criminal provisions could survive a
challenge for vagueness without it. 2 3 8 Considering the Sherman Act's
comparable complexity and much more severe penalties, 239 its lower

("The invitation for particularized examination gives fair use its flexibility, and permits it
to seem to be all things to all people."); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as
Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 1781, 1786 (2010) ("But exactly what 'fair' means is
uncertain.... [F]air use has no definitional boundaries . . . .").
235. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
237. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (second alteration in original) (quoting 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY,
MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 13.05 [A] [4] (1993)).
238. See, e.g., Abruzzi, supra note 185, at 383 ("With the added overlay of the willfulness requirement to protect a defendant from blundering into liability, copyright's expressly criminal provisions ultimately present a less consequential vagueness problem than the
civil infringement remedies do."); Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The
FirstAmendment's ProportionalityProblem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 616-17 (2014); Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization:The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
835, 892 (1999) ("The highly technical nature of the Copyright Act coupled with the subtle
nature of this evanescent law . . . borders on not giving adequate notice to individuals of
the conduct proscribed."); cf Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and
Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2467 (1998) (noting
that the absence of this mens rea requirement for civil infringement may render it "wholly
or partly unconstitutional" under vagueness doctrine).
239. Criminal copyright offenses, depending on the nature of the act, are punishable by
up to five years imprisonment and "not more than $150,000" in statutory damages for firsttime violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a)-(d) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). Under the Sher-
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mens rea requirement-applicable only to a fraction of cases to begin
with-would simply not be sufficient to save the Sherman Act from a
modern vagueness challenge. Incorporating all of the vagueness concerns raised in this Article thus far, the Sherman Act's position looks
considerably bleak.

VI.

DIVERGENT SOLUTIONS

The previous four Parts have outlined in detail the vulnerabilities
of the Sherman Act with respect to vagueness doctrine. To avoid the
true import of a statutory text written without limits, the courts
manufactured a system of rules without specificity or clarity. To wit,
despite almost no legislative intervention, antitrust law has floated
freely with economic theory and cycle, and any judicially-created
bright-line rules have been either eliminated or blurred. Simultaneously, there has been a fairly drastic increase in penalties associated
with antitrust violations-particularly criminal violations-alongside
an increase in tension with areas of concern to the First Amendment.
Exacerbating matters even further, the Sherman Act's deus ex
machina-the creation of a saving mens rea requirement out of the
ether-has proven impractical and incomplete, where it has not been
abrogated entirely.
After examining these shortcomings laid out in detail side by side,
one might conclude that the Sherman Act is flawed fundamentally
with respect to vagueness, and thus rightfully ought to be invalidated
on those grounds-or at least that the author so believes. Nevertheless, to any keen observer-and even the author-it should be easily
recognized that a robust form of antitrust enforcement is needed now
perhaps more than ever, with complete overhaul an unlikely solution.
Industry sectors across the board are becoming increasingly concentrated, 2 4 0 with an associated "clear tendency toward anticompetitive
outcome" in terms of increased prices 241 and decreased innovation. 2 4 2
man Act, even first-time violators are liable for up to ten years imprisonment and
$1,000,000 in fines. See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND
INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/

sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea-competition issue brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8D7U-3RUV] (analyzing data from 1997 to 2012 across thirteen broad sectors and concluding that "[s]everal indicators suggest that competition may be decreasing in many economic
sectors, including the decades-long decline in new business formation and increases in
industry-specific measures of concentration," including data showing "that returns may
have risen for the most profitable firms"); Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needsgiant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/W2WL-CCYL].
241. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 94 (2015).

242. See, e.g., Carmine Ornaghi, Mergers and Innovation in Big Pharma, 27 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 70 (2009) (showing statistically significant declines in research and develop-
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This is in addition to more novel concerns such as regional inequality 24 3 or monopolization of Internet platforms and services.2 44 Abrogation of major swaths of antitrust law would, at this point in time, potentially work far more harm than good.
But it is precisely because of these economic challenges ahead that
the vagueness of antitrust law's central statute must be confronted
head-on. In the worst case, a challenge successfully articulating the
vagueness arguments herein could shut down entire areas of enforcement until legislative intervention. Even in the best case, latent
fears of vulnerability in the law may ironically lead to underenforcement at times.245 The remaining question is, therefore, how
best to address the shortcomings of the Sherman Act with respect to
vagueness, assuming a more drastic overhaul to be both implausible
and impractical. 2 46

ment expenditures and productivity among merged pharmaceutical companies as compared to non-merged firms).
243.

See, e.g., Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring 'Local Con-

trol" as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006) (reviewing empirical literature associating negative socioeconomic effects with loss of regional firm control through
mergers, and proposing a reorientation of antitrust merger policy around those regionspecific costs); Phillip Longman, Why the Economic Fates of America's Cities Diverged,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/citieseconomic-fates-diverge/417372/ [https://perma.cc/Z739-JZLM] (citing a decrease in airline,
railroad, and trucking competition as one major driver of regional inequality, with refocused antitrust law as one potential solution).

244.

See, e.g., Newman, supra note 180, at 151, 176 (arguing that "antitrust law has

failed to develop an adequate response to zero-price markets," such as online social media, communication, and search platforms, leading to concentration and monopolization);
John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-PriceMarkets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49
(2016) (expanding on the same concept, and setting forth specific antitrust solutions and

applications).
245. The ur-example of this is perhaps the Apple eBook case. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015). In that case, Apple was accused of orchestrating a
collusive price-fixing conspiracy among publishers. Id. at 297. Despite such conduct falling
well within per se analysis (being labeled by the court as no less than "the supreme evil of
antitrust") and the existence of "ample ...
evidence" demonstrating "express collusion,"
and approval of the conclusion that "Apple was more than an innocent bystander," only

civil penalties were applied. Apple, 791 F.3d at 316; Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
246. For more comprehensive proposals to redesign antitrust law that would, at least
incidentally, also reduce vagueness concerns, see Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1194-97 (2008) (arguing in favor of more "informal solutions
and negotiated agreements," like the DOJ and FTC's approach to merger review, rather
than explicit criminal or civil adjudication); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the
Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in the Lower Courts and What it Means for Institutional Re-

form in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1919, 1940 (2015) (suggesting that the FTC follow a
practice of "notice-and-comment rulemaking" to steer antitrust policy through Chevron
deference); Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New

Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2011) (advocating for "an antitrust agency with authority
to make Sherman Act rules," instead of "forcing the Court to approximate agency decision
making"); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and

Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 670-82 (2009) (propos-

20181

AVOIDING VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS

759

Reducing the severity of the Sherman Act's criminal penalties-or
elimination of its criminal application entirely-would go far in lessening vagueness concerns and is perhaps the cleanest approach. This
solution, however, has at least three key drawbacks. First, it would
require direct legislative intervention, 24 7 which appears unlikely given the long-term decline in the political salience of antitrust law. 2 48
And, absent a statutory rewrite, even if the DOJ were to abstain from
criminal antitrust prosecution entirely, the potential for severe criminal penalties would still be written into the antitrust laws-thereby
informing any vagueness analysis. Second, criminal antitrust law
serves unique purposes that may be impossible to fulfill with civilonly application. To the leadership of major corporations, fines alone
may "seem trivial"249 or be shifted entirely to stockholders,25 0 offering
far less of a deterrent effect than imprisonment and a criminal record. 25 ' Third, the civil-only solution may not even be sufficient to
eliminate vagueness vulnerability. Given the severity of the Sherman
Act's civil penalties in addition to its textual and doctrinal ambiguity,
its tension with the First Amendment, and its current lack of a
meaningful mens rea requirement, it may not survive even under the
more lax standards associated with purely civil vagueness analysis.
Another potential approach might be to curtail the ambiguity in
Sherman Act doctrine directly, by establishing more bright-line rules.
Fairly clear per se rules unraveled (either implicitly or explicitly) into
the rule of reason through case law alone,'2 52 so the Court is free to

remake those rules without waiting for congressional action. But
ing a more focused role for the FTC as research and data aggregator, thereby enabling
other agencies or Congress to develop explicit antitrust rules).
247. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory provisions
governing criminal antitrust penalties).
248.

See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND

EXECUTION 1-10 (2005); Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a PoliticalBargain, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2006); Crane, supra note 246, at 1159; Harry First & Spencer Weber
Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013).

249. Drew Feeley, Personality, Environment, and the Causes of White-Collar Crime, 30
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 201, 209-13 (2006); see, e.g., Philip F.S. Berg, Unfit to Serve: Permanently BarringPeople from Serving as Officers and Directorsof Publicly Traded Companies
after the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1896-98 (2003).
250. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 249, at 1896 ("However, indemnification contracts, corporate by-laws, and insurance contracts can shift the responsibility for . . . fines from executives to shareholders.").
251.

See, e.g., NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

172-73 (2006) ("There is reason to suppose ...
that white-collar offenders may be positioned ideally for learning the lessons of imprisonment. Prison is painful for them in ways
that differ from the pains of the typical street offender. . . . If nothing else, it shocks and
forces them to confront the fact that many people take their crime seriously."); Jennifer S.
Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1563 (2002).
252. See supra Section II.B.2.
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again, this approach exhibits fairly strong disadvantages. First and
foremost, using only bright-line rules and per se analysis sacrifices
doctrinal flexibility completely-flexibility that is arguably needed
for antitrust law to keep pace and maintain relevance in the face of
accelerating changes in the marketplace, business structure, and
technology. 253 Given those needs, even if the Court were to nominally
label more activities as falling under the rule of reason, lower courts
in practice would likely just shift even more flexibility and adaptability to step-zero analyses. 2 5 4 On net, this would do little to address
vagueness concerns; to the extent it forces courts to be less transparent with their decisionmaking calculus, it may actually make matters
worse.2 5 5 Finally, even if this approach were desirable, the Court itself seems highly unlikely to take it. The Court's tendency in more
recent decades, across doctrines, has been to avoid bright-line rules
wherever possible in favor of more flexibly-applied standards.2 5 6
The need for both criminal application and flexibility in antitrust
law seems unavoidable, and yet those two factors alone contribute to
vagueness concerns considerably. This leads to a third possible solution: perhaps the time for a revised mens rea requirement has finally
253. See, e.g., Markham, Jr., supra note 80, at 597-98 ("It is of course desirable, indeed
unavoidable, that the rule of reason invites some degree of flexibility. Commerce, in a
sense, is like a flowing river.. .. No two restraints are identical, and no two restraints are
imposed within identical marketplace contexts."); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 81, at 1264
("When categorical reasoning does not help the decision-maker identify and condemn unreasonable trade restraints, such an approach is at best unnecessary and at worst counterproductive . . . ."); Stucke, supra note 5, at 1475 ("In other words, a rule-of-reason standard
must apply at the margins of any rule of law to respond flexibly with various alternatives
and resolve novel problems that continually emerge over time. A novel case readjusts the
relations, proportions, and values of each legal precedent toward the whole, and thus becomes part of the whole." (footnote omitted)); Barbara Ann White, CountervailingPowerDifferent Rules for Different Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1066 (1992) (arguing that overreliance on per se analysis "leads to
inflexible rules that do not consider other competitive and efficiency factors, and can unnecessarily impede economic growth") (footnote omitted).
254. See supra Section II.B.2.
255. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
256.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT, at ix (1999) (arguing that the contemporary Court has displayed a tendency to "settle[ the case before it" while "avoid[ing] clear rules and final resolutions"
with broader application); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit
Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am. U. L. REV. 457, 475 (2012) (articulating "the Court's widespread use of standards (as opposed to bright-line rules)"); see
also Beverly E. Bashor, The Liberty/Safety Paradigm: The United States' Struggle to
Discourage Violations of Civil Liberties in Times of War, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 620
(2014) (arguing that the Court has not "provide[d] bright-line rules with respect to civil
liberties," leading to potential issues in wartime); Matthew R. Christiansen & William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1429 (2014) (observing the tendency of the
Court to deny "criminal prosecutors ...
the defendant-grabbing, bright-line rules they
prefer"); Sipe, supra note 61, at 435-36 (noting the Court's firm pattern of "pushback"
against bright-line rules in the patent context).
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come. Setting aside the potential benefits of a more fundamental or
institutional overhaul of the antitrust regime, which are beyond the
scope of this Article, properly refocusing the mens rea requirement
on an intent to violate the law itself would appear to be the most
straightforward yet comprehensive solution. Such an approach has
the benefits of being both judicially-implementable-since the Sherman Act's mens rea requirement was wholly judicially-created in the
first place 2-as
well as familiar. As detailed in Part V, this type of
mens rea requirement is already used to mark the divide between
criminal and civil copyright violations, among several other technical
and flexible areas of law.
The chief drawback to this approach would be the heavy burden of
proof it would place on prosecutors; the result could potentially be
well-below-optimal conviction rates.2 5 8 That being said, ameliorating
latent concerns over constitutionality (as well as freestanding considerations such as the rule of lenity) paves the way for a more robust
enforcement regime-at least partially offsetting that drawback.2 5 9
And again, it should be emphasized that the status quo is untenable
vis-a-vis vagueness, risking abrogation outright. Surely, some antitrust enforcement is better than none.
VI. CONCLUSION

If subjected to a modern void-for-vagueness challenge, the Sherman Act likely would not pass muster. Although previous high-profile
attempts to invalidate the core Act of antitrust law as unconstitutionally vague were unsuccessful, the landscape has changed considerably since then. The deficiencies of the statutory text in terms of
notice and consistency have only been enhanced by a long-term pattern of judicially-created rules that tolerate and maintain ambiguity,
whether categorical or substantive. The penalties for Sherman Act
violations have been repeatedly increased, along with robust enforcement-making good-faith mistakes particularly costly. Tension
with the First Amendment has likewise been amplified, both directly
and through second-order effects on communication and information
markets. The erstwhile attempt to create a saving mens rea require-

257. See supra Section V.B.
258. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness
of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. L. REV. 21, 52-53 (2001) (describing "knowledge ...
that
such action is against the law" as the second-most "difficult to prove" mental state of
twelve, behind only the "premeditation" state associated with "first-degree murder"); Andrew Schouten, Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business and Mens Rea Under the USA
PATRIOT Act, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2008) (arguing that "[i]gnorance of the
law is no excuse" precisely "because it would be too difficult to prove that a person knew
the law when he claimed otherwise").
259. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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ment for the Sherman Act has proved unworkable and illogical at
best-where it has not been abrogated entirely. Without alteration,
the Sherman Act's future is constitutionally suspect. Eliminating
criminal application or resurrecting long-dead bright-line rules may
offer partial solutions, but reworking the Sherman Act's mens rea
requirement is a more pragmatic and satisfactory way forward.

